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After September 11, the emergence of global terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and dramatic changes in the security environment led once 
again to debate about the future of NATO. The U.S.–led Iraq War deepened the debate 
and created one of the gravest crises in the history of the Alliance. 
Although the Alliance experienced a difficult period, it managed to carry out its 
ongoing transformation efforts to meet the new challenges. At the Istanbul Summit of 
2004, the first NATO meeting since the onset of the Iraq crisis, leaders of the Alliance 
acknowledged their commitment to meeting these new challenges. This thesis argues that 
the Iraq crisis was mainly a product of leadership failures and that a strategic divorce for 
the Alliance in the near future seems very unlikely. Within this context, the thesis also 
analyzes the nature of the Iraq crisis and the ties that bind NATO members on both sides 
of the Atlantic.   
Given the steps taken by NATO in its transformation, the changing security 
environment, and the United States’ and Europe’s unique strategic cultures, the thesis 
concludes that, while maintaining its original collective defense commitment, NATO will 
now also perform a collective security function throughout a broader region, especially in 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine NATO’s potential future roles —
from collective defense to collective security — in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century. What is NATO’s role in the new security environment stemming from 9/11, said 
to be “one of the gravest crises of the Transatlantic Alliance,” that resulted in the U.S.–
led Iraq war? 
To answer that question, this thesis analyzes the transformation efforts of the 
Alliance since the end of Cold War and the differences and similarities between the 
United States’ and Europe’s strategic cultures. This analysis will shed some much-needed 
light on the direction in which the Alliance is headed. 
The ongoing debate about the role of NATO, which began after the end of both 
the Cold War and the major threat from the Soviet Union, gained further importance after 
9/11 and the crisis over the Iraq War. After the Cold War ended, some argued that NATO 
had done its job and no longer had any purpose. But the unfolding events in the Balkans 
soon justified the findings of others who saw NATO as the international organization 
most capable of meeting the challenges posed by the new security environment. They 
argued that new security environment created unprecedented challenges which required 
new capabilities and concepts as well as a more cooperative effort by all nations to deal 
with these challenges effectively. By carrying out the recommendations of the 1999 
Washington Summit in its efforts to meet the new challenges, NATO managed not only 
to survive but also to achieve a remarkable transformation from a Cold War defence 
Alliance to a Pan-European security organization.1
All agree, in general, that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 produced further challenges 
to NATO’s relevance and future, and three related questions about NATO’s capabilities, 
in particular, have been raised. First, “is NATO sufficiently adaptable and flexible to be 
of significant use in an age of asymmetric warfare?” Second, “can and should Alliance 
 
1 Douglas Stuart, “NATO’s Future as a Pan-European Security Institution,” NATO Review, Vol. 41, 
No. 4 (August 1993), < http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9304-4.htm> (accessed 14 March 2006). 
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structures and resources be deployed in military operations outside Europe?” Finally, 
“does any of this matter, given that the United States may be losing interest in 
international institutions generally and in NATO in particular?”2 To some extent, the 
Prague summit showed the willingness of NATO members to meet the new challenges 
together, as they launched the Prague Capabilities Commitments as part of continuing 
Alliance efforts to improve and to develop new military capabilities for modern warfare 
in a high-threat environment. 
Nonetheless, the U.S.–led Iraq War brought about a grave crisis in the Atlantic 
Alliance that highlighted the differences on both sides of the Atlantic. And thus, in the 
post-9/11 world, NATO once again faces an existential crisis. “The combination of new 
global security challenges, the achievement of much of NATO’s historic missions in 
Europe, and increasing unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy calls the Alliance’s future into 
question.” Some analysts suggested that NATO must either respond to the new security 
challenges by developing a global role or face redundancy.3 Others argued that moving 
outside Europe would likely undermine the important roles that NATO still has to play in 
its own neighborhood and weaken the alliance’s overall effectiveness and viability.4 
NATO obviously preferred the former option. It took over the peacekeeping mission in 
Afghanistan, began a training mission in Iraq, offered partnerships to countries in the 
Middle East, and, most recently, lent logistic and training support to the African Union’s 
peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Sudan. 
In addition, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has carried out an open-door 
policy and has accepted ten new members. For Alliance supporters, enlargement was 
seen as a kind of litmus test of NATO’s ability to adapt and thus survive. Opponents, on 
the other hand, believed that the basic security and stability of wider Europe would be 
 
2 “Introduction,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.25, No.3 (December 2004), p. 388. 
3 Andrew Cottey, “NATO: Globalization or Redundancy,” Ibid., pp. 391-392. 




                                                
endangered by the enlargement. Nonetheless, despite all the doubts, NATO has clearly 
survived the end of the Cold War and is bigger and busier than at any time in its history.5
The major question now is what is the future of NATO? NATO is currently 
undergoing its most challenging transformation both militarily and politically since its 
formation. Its future existence will depend on its ability to find roles and capabilities that 
are appropriate and solid enough to hold the two sides of the Atlantic together. NATO’s 
failure could result in widespread instability and conflict which would dominate the 
world more easily in the absence of the kinds of international organizations that existed in 
the past. 
This thesis examines the tendencies in transatlantic relations and attempts to 
determine where the Alliance is headed and its potential roles. The thesis explores not 
only the essential aspects of the Alliance and its transformation efforts, but also the 
questions surrounding NATO’s ability to handle the challenges of the new security 
environment. In the process, the thesis analyzes the strategic cultures of the United States 
and its European partners to determine whether the dominant tendency in transatlantic 
relations in the coming era will be conflict or cooperation. In that regard, an examination 
of the Alliance’s latest crisis is crucial for understanding both the nature of the crisis 
itself and the tendencies apparent in its aftermath.   
In the future, the global security environment will be much more complex and 
have many more challenging problems than in the past that can be dealt with only by the 
cooperative effort of all nations. In light of those challenges, in the second decade of the 
twenty-first century NATO must maintain its position as the most capable international 
organization: no single nation can handle the complex future security environment alone. 
Furthermore, NATO’s development of conventional force structures and doctrines 
suggests that, even in regard to the relatively unglamorous aspects of the Alliance, all its 
members will continue to have clear and strong interests in play. This will enhance the 
cooperation between nations, especially the United States and EU members. NATO will 
no longer be only a regional security organization; it will also function as a collective 
 
5 “Conclusions: Where is NATO Going,” Ibid., pp. 425-426. 
 
4 
security organization with its first front abroad, especially in the Middle East and 
Northern Africa. To accomplish this, NATO, especially European states, must transform 
their capabilities to meet the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century and thus 
maintain NATO’s dominant position in the future. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
As background for exploring the Alliance’s potential role in the future, the thesis 
first discusses the transformation of NATO and other contributing circumstances, such as 
the changing challenges of the regional and global security environment and the political 
divergence between the transatlantic partners that affect the future functioning of NATO. 
The thesis examines the concrete steps in the Alliance’s transformation and analyzes both 
U.S. and EU perspectives on security issues and tries to find their implications for the 
future of NATO. 
The thesis is based on a qualitative survey of relevant literature, including both 
primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include: the 1949 North Atlantic 
Treaty, NATO’s 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, the 1999 Washington Summit 
Communiqué, the 2002 Prague Summit Declaration, the 2004 Istanbul Summit 
Declaration, the NATO Handbook, the September 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, 
the December 2003 EU Security Strategy, and other concepts, treaties, agreements, 
meeting records, speeches, and declarations by NATO, U.S., and EU officials. The 
secondary sources include books, scholarly articles, and newspaper articles. To achieve a 
positivist approach, both descriptive and deductive methods are used. The thesis 
organization is as follows. 
This chapter introduces the purpose and significance of the thesis. Chapter II 
sheds light on essential aspects of the Alliance and on its significant transformation 
efforts since the end of the Cold War. The chapter also demonstrates where the Alliance 
seems to be headed. In this regard, this chapter begins by analyzing the transatlantic 
bargain made when NATO was formulated and its transformational efforts to meet new 
challenges throughout its long history. Although NATO has been involved in some kind 
of transformation process since its creation, main focus of chapter II is the period after 
the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, the chapter analyzes, in particular, the Washington 
 
5 
Summit of 1999, the 1999 Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), NATO’s 1999 Strategic 
Concept, the 2002 Prague Summit, and the 2004 Istanbul Summit. All of those make 
valuable contributions to our attempt to determine the future of the Alliance. 
Chapter III aims to reflect the current situation of transatlantic relations in regard 
to their respective strategic cultures. This chapter comprises a comparative analysis of the 
U.S. and the EU National Security Strategies. The discussion focuses on six main 
aspects: the security environment; perceived responsibilities; strategic objectives; threat 
perceptions; strategies; and international cooperation — unilateralism versus 
multilateralism. 
Chapter IV looks at the grave transatlantic crisis over the Iraq War and its affect 
on the future of transatlantic relations. In this regard, the chapter considers the impact of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the reaction of an injured superpower, and the leadership 
failures that deepened the crisis. It then explores the strong ties between the two sides of 
the Atlantic, divided here into three main categories: their shared values and public 
opinion, their security environments, and their economic interdependency. Thus, though 
it concludes that a divorce seems impossible in the near future, the chapter notes the 
establishment of a new transatlantic bargain, broadening its terms from collective defense 
to collective security while recognizing at the same time the implications of the military 
capabilities gap between the two sides. 
Chapter V concludes that the new challenges that gained dramatic importance 
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 left NATO no other choice but to meet them if it is to 
retain its validity in the future. NATO has accomplished considerable transformation to 
meet these challenges. And though the Alliance may not have quite the significance it 
had before the Iraq crisis, as its critics claim, it will at least be there for the foreseeable 
future. From this analysis of NATO’s transformation efforts and the emerging strategic 
cultures on both sides of the Atlantic, Chapter V concludes that, in addition to keeping its 
original collective defense commitment, NATO will also carry out a collective security 
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II. TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE: THE END OF THE COLD 
WAR 
The end of the Cold War created a more complex environment than the one in 
which NATO had been created in 1949. The breakup of the Soviet Union, reunification 
of Germany, and transformation of the USSR’s former communist states, along with 
dramatically increasing globalization, resulted in an environment full of new challenges 
requiring equally new tools and strategies. Consequently, the post–Cold War era 
witnessed a great transformational effort by the NATO Alliance to meet the challenges 
posed by the new security environment and to maintain its relevance in the future.6
In this chapter, my goal is both to shed light on the Alliance’s essence along with 
its significant transformation efforts after the Cold War and to demonstrate where the 
Alliance seems to be headed. 
A. THE ESSENCE OF THE ALLIANCE: TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN 
AND THE NATO TREATY 
The creation of NATO is rooted in the aftermath of World War II. The complex 
circumstances involving Europe’s need for economic reconstruction, its weakness and 
vulnerability in the context of the USSR’s expansionist policies, and the emerging 
ideological divergence between the two blocs created an environment that tightly linked 
U.S. and European interests. Furthermore, the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, the blockade 
of Berlin, and the direct threat to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece, Turkey, and other 
Western European countries greatly increased the inherent postwar anxiety of Europeans 
and Americans alike.7
Thus, eventually, the 1948 Brussels Treaty, which had reflected the determination 
of five Western European countries — Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom — to create a common defense system, led to negotiations with 
 
6 Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, “NATO: Ready to Meet the Challenges Ahead,” his speech 
at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, 15 March 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/ 
1999/s990315a.htm> (accessed 14 March 2006). 
7 NATO Handbook, Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2006, p. 29). 
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the United States and Canada and the “creation of a single North Atlantic Alliance based 
on security guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America.”8
According to the NATO Handbook, therefore, the creation of the Alliance was 
based on both “unsentimental calculations of national self-interest on both sides of the 
Atlantic and some amorphous but vital shared ideas about man, government, and 
society.” Furthermore, Harland Cleveland, a former U.S. representative to NATO, after a 
crystallizing definition of the Alliance as a “Transatlantic Bargain,” went on to describe, 
the nature and the essence of the Alliance. 
The glue that has held the allies more or less together is a large, complex, 
and dynamic bargain—partly an understanding among the Europeans, but 
mostly a deal between them and the United States of America.9           
While NATO remains the most important institutionalized expression of the deal, 
Stanley Sloan gives the details of the original transatlantic bargain: 
The original transatlantic bargain was a bargain between the United States 
and its original European partners with the militarily modest but politically 
important participation of Canada. The deal, based on interpretations of 
the diplomacy of time, was that the United States would contribute to the 
defense of Europe and to Europe’s economic recovery from the war if the 
Europeans would organize themselves to help defend against the Soviet 
threat and use the economic aid efficiently.10  
In essence, the creation of NATO was the best practical response to the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union. From this perspective, Donald Abenheim sheds light on the 





8 NATO Handbook, p. 29. 
9 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic 




                                                
Europeans wanted real protection, not parasitic security and defense 
relationships that would leave them in a strategic no-man’s-land as in 
1919–1939 and in 1944–1946. NATO membership can finally banish the 
enduring ill effects of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact (1939) and the Yalta 
agreements (1945) that divided and prefigured the outbreak of the cold 
war in Central and Eastern Europe.11  
In this regard, the bottom line was that NATO was established as a collective 
defense system, as was clearly stated in the NATO handbook: “NATO’s essential 
purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and 
military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the 
United Nations Charter.”12 Thus, from the very beginning, the Alliance was perceived, 
not as a simple military alliance, a “collection of guns,” against a clear threat for a 
particular time, but as a permanent alliance that also would provide political and 
economical benefits for its members. As the U.S. director for mutual security, Averill 
Harriman, declared on the third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty: 
Through NATO, we are working for the common defense against 
aggression. Through NATO, we are working for economic expansion and 
the prosperity of all our peoples. Through NATO, we are seeking to 
release the intellectual and social forces which are our common heritage.13
The basic document, the North Atlantic Treaty itself, which gave birth to NATO, 
was signed in Washington, D.C., on 4 April 1949. With its plain language and the 
simplicity of the context, the treaty reflects the “spirit of the Charter of the United 
Nations” and, indeed, obtains its legitimacy from that charter. By signing the treaty, 
members “committed themselves to maintaining and developing their defense 
capabilities, individually and collectively, providing the basis for collective defense 
planning.”14
 
11 Donald Abenheim, “The Big Bang of NATO Enlargement: Goetterdaemmerung or Rebirth?” NPS 
Center for Contemporary Conflict, National Security Affairs Department, Strategic Insights, Volume II, 
Issue 2, February 2003. <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/feb03/europe.asp> (accessed 13 February 2006). 
12 NATO Handbook, p. 30. 
13 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination, Oxford: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 1997, p. 36.   
14 “What is NATO?” NATO On-line Library: NATO Fact Sheets. 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/ what-is.htm> (accessed 13 February 2006). 
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Furthermore, the Treaty was written in such a way that, while it strengthened the 
ties between the members, it also, as Stanley Sloan notes, enabled the Alliance to survive 
under changing circumstances. 
The North Atlantic Treaty was designed to counter Soviet expansion and 
military power. But the Treaty itself was based on common values, 
identified no enemy, protected the sovereign decision-making rights of all 
members, and was written in sufficiently flexible language to facilitate 
adjustments to accommodate changing international circumstances.15
Thus, as noted, the North Atlantic Treaty designates the basic principles under 
which the Alliance will operate. First, and most important, it gives the primary 
responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security to the United Nations 
Security Council and “reaffirms the members’ faith in the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations.” Additionally, although the Treaty reinforces the 
members’ obligation to unite their efforts for collective defense, Article 3 sets out an 
important feature of the Alliance — the principles of “self-help” and “mutual aid.” To 
maintain the internal coherence of the Treaty, Article 4 adds “consultation” as a crucial 
principle. The essence of the Alliance, on the other hand, finds a place in Article 5, which 
groups all the members together on the same side should one or more of them be 
attacked.16
B. NATO’S STRUGGLE TO MEET NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES 
1. Transformation of the Alliance (1949-1999) 
For the North Atlantic Alliance, transformation was not a new phenomenon 
created by the end of the Cold War; it has been an inseparable aspect of the Alliance from 
the very beginning. Under the guidance of the North Atlantic Treaty and within the 
flexibility given by it, the Alliance has developed a variety of strategies to meet the 
challenges of the changing security environment. 
On 19 October 1949, the first NATO strategy document, “The Strategic Concept 
for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area,” was issued. Many other versions of Alliance 
 
15 Sloan, p. 3. 
16 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C. 4 April 1949. <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ 
treaty.htm> (accessed 13 February 2006). 
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strategy followed. Although the Alliance, in the initial document, mentions nuclear 
weapons and a goal, a U.S. responsibility, to “ensure the ability to deliver the atomic 
bomb promptly,” its actual overall goal was to recover from the effects of the Second 
World War by obtaining “adequate military strength accompanied by economy of effort, 
resources, and manpower.”17
During the first twenty years of the Cold War era, in order to stay on course in the 
midst of changing circumstances, the Alliance produced twenty-two strategic concepts. 
Their main objective was “to convince the USSR that war does not pay,” and, in case of a 
war, to ensure a successful defense of NATO territories. In addition, however, the 
Alliance aimed “to destroy by a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia the will and 
capabilities of the USSR and her satellites to wage war,” by using all types of weapons in 
DC 6/1, the Strategic Concept of December 1949.18
Three years later, the Alliance embraced the concept of using an air-offensive 
strategy, before ground or sea operations, in order to destroy the will and the capability 
entailed in the Warsaw Pact. Later, however, during the ten-year period, 1957 to 1967, 
the Alliance’s strategic culture was shaped by a strategy of “massive retaliation” based on 
two types of NATO forces, “nuclear retaliatory forces” and “shield forces.” But, as more 
time elapsed, by the end of Cold War, NATO had come to rely on a “flexible response” 
strategy, a combination of three types of military response: “direct defense,” “deliberate 
escalation,” and “general nuclear response.”19  
With the end of Cold War, the changing nature of the security environment again 
forced the Alliance to modify its strategies. At a meeting in London in 1990, NATO 
heads of state and government agreed on the need to transform the Alliance to fit the new 
security environment. Thus, while preserving the primary role of the Alliance — “to 
guarantee the security and the territorial integrity of member states” — at the Rome 
 
17 NATO Archives: NATO Strategy Documents 1949–1969,” edited by Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow, 
Chief, Historical Office, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, p. xi.  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/ eng/intro.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2006). 
18 Ibid., pp. xiii, xiv. 
19 Hans-Eberhard Peters, “NATO Strategy – Evolution,” The Handnote for “NS3720 European 
Security Institutions,” 13 October 2005.  
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Summit in November 1991, the Allies developed a strategy based on “a reduced forward 
presence and a flexible response that stemmed from reduced reliance on nuclear 
weapons.” Furthermore, realizing that “security and stability have political, economic, 
social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension,” the 
Alliance developed “a broad approach to security” that was based on three main pillars: 
dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.20
In January 1994, at the Summit Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Brussels, NATO launched a “Partnership for Peace” initiative whose purpose was to 
enhance stability and security throughout Europe.21 Later that same year, after 
approaching nonmember states on the European continent, NATO also launched “a 
Mediterranean Initiative aimed at engaging selected nonmember states across the 
Mediterranean in dialogue on security issues.”22 Apart from that, NATO took a further 
step, based on Article 10 of the NATO treaty, and invited three nonmember countries —
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland — to begin accession talks at the Madrid 
Summit in 1997.23
However, while NATO was in the middle of its transformation process, it was 
also busy militarily in the conflict in the Balkans. And many scholars argue that the 
“involvement in the Balkans marked a turning point in NATO’s history: a move beyond 
its Cold War task of defending members’ territories and into crisis management outside 
its traditional borders.”24
 
20 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Online Library: NATO Basic Texts. <http://www.nato.int/ 
docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm> (accessed 13 February 2006). 
21 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council/ North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10–11 January 1994. 
<http://www .nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111a.htm> (accessed 14 February 2006). 
22 Ian O. Lesser, Jerrold D. Green, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Michele Zanini, “The Future of NATO’s 
Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps,” National Security Research Division, RAND, 
prepared for the Spanish Ministry of Defense, 2000, p. iii.  
23 Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and 
Government, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Press Release M-1 (97)81, Madrid, 8 July 1997. 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm> (accessed 14 February 2006). 
24 NATO in the Balkans, NATO Topics. <http://www.nato.int/issues/balkans/index.html> (accessed 
14 February 2006). 
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To end the hostilities and to separate the armed forces of the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and those of the Republika Srpska, in December 1995 the Alliance 
deployed a 60,000-man implementation force (IFOR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This 
was NATO’s first large-scale operational peacekeeping mission.25 A year later, in light of 
the improved security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Stabilisation Force (SFOR) 
replaced the IFOR. The SFOR’s mission was to maintain a secure environment and 
facilitate the country's reconstruction until 2004, when it would be replaced by European 
forces (EUFOR) under the European Union’s (EU) control.26 Furthermore, in March 
1999, in an effort to halt the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding in Kosovo, 
NATO launched an air campaign, Operation Allied Force.27  
2. Washington Summit (1999) 
In his press briefing, Secretary General Javier Solana announced that the members 
of the Alliance were gathered in Washington, D.C., both to celebrate NATO’s 50th 
anniversary and to discuss ways the Alliance could prepare “to handle the complex 
security challenges that the twenty-first century is certain to bring.”28 Although the 
leaders of the Alliance focused mainly on the crisis in Kosovo, agreeing to end the 
conflict and restore the rights of the people of Kosovo, they also drew up a road map for 
the Alliance at the beginning of this new century.29 Overall, the Alliance members: 
• approved an updated Strategic Concept; 
• developed a Membership Action Plan for countries wishing to join; 
• completed work on key elements of the Berlin Decisions for building a 
European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance and decided to 
further enhance its effectiveness; 
 
25 Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995–1996), NATO Topics. 
<http://www.nato.int/issues/ifor/index.html> (accessed 14 February 2006). 
26 The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO Topics. <http://www.nato.int/ 
issues/sfor/index.html> (accessed 14 February 2006). 
27 NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo, Historical Overview. 
<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/ history.htm> (accessed 14 February 2006). 
28 Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, “Open Letter by the Secretary General to Journalists 
attending the Washington Summit Meetings,” p. 2. <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/pres-
eng/01open.pdf> (accessed 14 February 2006). 
29 Achievements of the Washington Summit, NATO Fact Sheets. 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/ ach-summ.htm> (accessed 14 February 2006). 
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• launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative; 
• intensified relations with Partners through an enhanced and more 
operational Partnership for Peace and strengthened the consultations and 
co-operation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; 
• enhanced the Mediterranean Dialogue; and 
• decided to increase Alliance efforts against weapons of mass destruction 
and their means of delivery.30 
As they clearly stated: “the NATO of the twenty-first century starts today.” 
NATO leaders’ goal in taking these steps was to create “a NATO which retains the 
strengths of the past and has new missions, new members and new partnerships of the 
future.”31
a. Strategic Concept of 1999 
At the 1999 Washington Summit meeting, NATO leaders approved a 
strategy to prepare and equip the Alliance for the security environment of the coming 
century and to guide its political and military development.32 Thus, by definition, the 
strategic concept was primarily a response to the changing nature of the security 
environment in the 1990s. Although, the Alliance had produced a Strategic Concept in 
1991 appropriate for the post–Cold War environment, the rapidly changing nature of the 
challenges in Europe as well as in the world globally required new ideas and new tactics. 
The 1999 Strategic Concept embraces NATO’s essential guiding principle 
and its enduring purpose as set out in the Washington Treaty: “to safeguard the freedom 
and security of all its members by political and military means.” But it also expresses a 
broadened approach to security by committing NATO to contribute to the peace and 
stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. In this regard, while reaffirming the 




30 Washington Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24 April 1999. 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/ pr/1999/p99-064e.htm> (accessed 14 February 2006). 
31 Ibid. 
32 NATO Handbook, p. 42. 
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new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, “including oppression, ethnic conflict, 
economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.”33
Furthermore, the Strategic Concept defines “security,” “consultation,” and 
“deterrence and defence” as the Alliance’s main security tasks for the Alliance if it is to 
achieve its essential purpose. “Crisis management” and “partnership” are defined as 
NATO’s main functions in its efforts to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-
Atlantic area. More specifically, to achieve these goals, the Alliance must: 
maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure 
a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. 
It must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession 
of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the 
military means required by the entire range of its missions.34
In the realm of geographical limitation, whereas the Washington Treaty 
has a limited responsibility area in Europe and North America, the 1999 Strategic 
Concept abolishes the geographical restrictions and aims to keep risks at a distance 
beyond the Allies’ territory by dealing with potential crises at an early stage.35  
In sum, although the Strategic Concept of 1999 does not replace the 
essence of the North Atlantic Treaty, it has important implications for the coming years.36 
Despite the fact that the Strategic Concept declares the Alliance’s commitment to the 
Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, it also accepts the necessity of taking 
action without the approval of the United Nation’s Security Council in non–Article 5 
 
33 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, as approved by the heads of state and government participating in 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on 23-24 April 1999. <http://www.nato.int/ 
docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm> (accessed 15 February 2006). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Hans-Eberhard Peters, “Synopsis: North Atlantic Treaty–Washington Summit Documents,” 
handnote for “NS3720 European Security Institutions,” p. 5. 
36 Erin LaPorte, “The Strategic Concept is Not a Replacement for the North Atlantic Treaty and the 




                                                
operations, on a case-by-case basis, after trying to get a UN mandate. In this regard, the 
Kosovo operation was a practical implementation of the Strategic Concept’s logic.37
b. Defence Capabilities Initiative (1999) 
At the Washington Summit, in keeping with the Strategic Concept, the 
NATO council also launched a Defence Capabilities Initiative designed to improve the 
capabilities and effectiveness of the Alliance to meet the security challenges of the 
twenty-first century. The aim of the initiative is twofold: while maintaining the ability to 
fulfill its traditional responsibilities for the defense of its member states, it also aims to 
increase the Alliance’s capacity to deal with non–Article 5 crises, like Kosovo. In this 
regard, as the secretary, Lord Robertson, pointed out, there are two main implications 
stemming from the initiative: 
The Defence Capabilities Initiative is designed to ensure that all Allies not 
only remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their 
capabilities to face the new security challenges.38
Thus, in accordance with the new Strategic Concept, the Defence 
Capabilities Initiative focused on new threats coming from the dramatically changing 
security environment. In this context, the initiative assumes, potential threats to Alliance 
security are more likely to come from “regional conflicts, ethnic strife or other crises 
beyond Alliance territory, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
their means of delivery,” not from a conventional large-scale military aggression.39
With that assessment of the nature of the threats in mind, the leaders came 
to the conclusion that, in the future, Alliance forces would operate mostly in non–Article 
5 missions outside Alliance territories. Therefore, though they made no firm political 
commitments,40 the members of the Council aimed at improving Alliance capabilities in 
five main categories: 
 
37 Sloan, p. 107. 
38 “NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative,” NATO Online Library, Fact Sheets, available at: 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-dci.htm>, accessed 15 February 2006. 
39 “Defence Capabilities Initiative,” NATO Summit Press Release, NAC-S(99)69, 25 April 1999, 
available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm>, accessed 15 February 2006. 
40 Hans-Eberhard Peters, “NATO/EU Capabilities,” The Handnote for NS3720 European Security 
Institutions, 20 May 2005. 
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• “mobility and deployability”: the ability to deploy forces quickly to where 
they are needed, including areas outside Alliance territory; 
• “sustainability”: the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their 
home bases and to ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for 
long-duration operations; 
• “effective engagement”: the ability to successfully engage an adversary in 
all types of operations, from high- to low-intensity; 
• “survivability”: the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against 
current and future threats; and 
• “interoperable communications”: command, control and information 
systems which are compatible with one another, to enable forces from 
different countries to work effectively together.41  
3. Prague Summit (2002) 
By invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO gave a warning to 
terrorists that they had crossed an unacceptable threshold. We must now 
back up that warning by ensuring that our forces have the evident 
capability to strike at these terrorists and their sponsors. And we must stop 
those who are proliferating the weapons of mass destruction that pose the 
most serious risk.42
As the above statements from Lord Robertson’s speech indicate, the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 deeply affected NATO’s transatlantic agenda and inevitably hastened and 
increased its ongoing transformation efforts for the Alliance’s success and survival in the 
twenty-first-century security environment. 
In this regard, although initially labeled “the Enlargement Summit,” the 2002 
Prague Summit was held mainly as a “transformation” meeting that would create “new 
members, new capabilities, and new relationships.” The transformation was intended, in 
effect, to both strengthen the Alliance “to meet the grave new threats and profound 
security challenges of the twenty-first century” and to enlarge the Alliance and thus make 
the extended Euro-Atlantic region more secure.43
 
41 NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative, NATO Online Library, Fact Sheets. 
42 Lord Robertson, “NATO on the Road to Prague,” Speech by NATO’s Secretary General at the 
Council on Foreign Relations Washington, D.C., 10 April 2002. <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/ 
s020410a.htm> (accessed 17 February 2006). 
43 “Prague Summit Declaration,” issued by the heads of state and government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002. 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> (accessed 17 February 2006). 
 
18 
                                                
The dangerous and threatening security environment manifested in the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 highlighted three crucial concerns for the fate of the Alliance: the two-fold 
threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the need for proper strategies to deal 
with those threats, and the need to develop the required military capabilities. 
Consequently, those concerns, in turn, defined three major directions for NATO’s 
transformation: 
First, NATO must find a new balance between addressing its traditional, 
Euro-centric missions and tackling the new global threats, such as 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Second, it must acquire the 
military capabilities to fulfill its new missions. And, finally, it must learn 
to react quickly and flexibly to new challenges.44
During the Prague meeting, the members focused on NATO’s biggest 
enlargement project — seven states —and the increasing intensity of NATO’s dialogue 
and partnership with nonmember states. The Alliance members also notably reached 
agreement, however, on the nature of the new threats and the strategies necessary to 
tackle them. In the process, they arrived at a new military concept for defense against 
terrorism built on three main pillars: “deter, disrupt, and defend.”45 In keeping with those, 
the leaders then launched three crucial military-transformation initiatives intended to 
adapt NATO’s military capabilities to the challenges of the security environment. 
In their “Prague Capabilities Commitment,” the Council members made “firm 
political commitments to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific areas, covering 
the following eight fields”: 
• chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence; 
• intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; 
• air-to-ground surveillance; 
• command, control and communications; 
 
44 Michael Ruhle, “NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11,” Parameters, Summer 2003, 33, 
2, Military Module. <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/ruhle.pdf> (accessed 17 
February 2006). 
45 “Transforming NATO,” Lord Robertson examines the significance of the Prague Summit and 
considers the challenges ahead, NATO Review: Interpreting Prague, Summer 2003. 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/ review/pdf/i1_en_review2003.pdf> (accessed 17 February 2006). 
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• combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and 
suppression of enemy air defences; 
• strategic air and sea lift; 
• air-to-air refueling; 
• deployable combat support and combat service support units.46 
• In addition to their Capabilities Commitment, the leaders also agreed to 
create a “NATO Response Force” that would: 
• act as a stand-alone force for Article 5 (collective defence) or non-Article 
5 crisis response operations such as evacuation operations, disaster 
consequence management (including chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear events), and support humanitarian crisis situations and 
counterterrorism operations; 
• be the initial entry force facilitating the arrival of larger follow-up forces; 
• be used as a show of NATO determination and solidarity to deter crises 
(quick response operations to support diplomacy as required).47 
In one final accomplishment at the Prague Summit, the leaders also agreed to 
streamline NATO’s military command arrangements and create “a leaner, more efficient, 
effective and deployable” command structure.48
In sum, almost a year after 9/11, the leaders of the NATO Alliance demonstrated 
their willingness to meet the challenges posed by the new security environment of 9/11 
and showed their consensus on ways to tackle these challenges. Thus, overall, the Prague 
Summit was highly significant. 
It sent a clear signal that irrespective of disagreements on individual 
issues, working together remains the preferred option for both sides of the 
Atlantic. As the transatlantic relationship enters another period of 
fundamental transition, NATO’s Prague Summit demonstrated that the 





46 “The Istanbul Summit Media Guide,” Chapter 7, p. 5 – Capabilities, 2004. 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/ comm/2004/06-istanbul/press-kit/005.pdf> (accessed 19 February 2006).  
47 Ibid., p. 6. 
48 Ibid., p. 8. 
49 Ruhle, p. 97. 
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4. Istanbul Summit (2004) 
As the first meeting of NATO leaders after the grave crisis over Iraq, the 2004 
Istanbul Summit was especially important for the consolidation of the Alliance’s 
solidarity. In Istanbul, the leaders reaffirmed “the enduring value of the transatlantic link 
and of NATO as the basis for collective defence and the essential forum for security 
consultation between Europe and North America.”50 Accordingly, to give further shape 
and direction to NATO’s transformation for the challenges of the twenty-first century, as 
well as to maintain its relevance, NATO members made important decisions about a 
number of crucial issues: 
• Expanding NATO’s operation in Afghanistan in support of the Bonn 
process; 
• Strengthening NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism, 
including WMD aspects; 
• Supporting stability in the Balkans, including through the completion of 
SFOR and a new EU mission in Bosnia, and through NATO’s continuing 
engagement in Kosovo; 
• Delivering more capable, usable and responsive forces in support of 
NATO's new missions; and 
• Strengthening cooperation with partners, especially in and beyond the 
Euro-Atlantic area.51 
In keeping with those decisions, the leaders of the Alliance took concrete steps to 
show their determination to meet the many contemporary challenges. In this regard, they 
agreed to take command of four new provincial reconstruction teams and to deploy extra 
troops to support the upcoming elections in Afghanistan as well as to assist with the 
training of Iraq’s security forces. Furthermore, they approved high-level political 
“usability” targets to ensure a permanently available pool of assets and forces that could 
be deployed swiftly on Alliance missions. On the other hand, they also decided to 
advance the “Mediterranean Dialogue” to a genuine partnership, and to launch the 
 
50 Istanbul Summit Communiqué, issued by the heads of state and government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Press Release, 28 June 2004. 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm> (accessed 19 February 2006). 
51 The Istanbul Summit Media Guide, Chapter 2, Outline of the Istanbul Summit and Previous Summit 




                                                
“Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” with select countries in the broader region of the Middle 
East. Last but not least, they enhanced the Alliance’s anti-terrorism efforts by improving 
intelligence sharing and by developing new, high-tech defenses against terrorism that 
boost the relevance of the Alliance to the current security environment and help restore 



















































                                                
III. U.S. – EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURES: CONFLICT OR 
COOPERATION? 
A. BACKGROUND 
The current U.S.-European relationship is rooted in history. First, from a general 
perspective, the United States can be seen as a continuation of Europe, because of the 
Europeans who came to America with not only hope and faith but also their hereditary 
culture and values. As viewed from this perspective, apart from the political arena, it is 
clear that there has always been a strong cultural tie between the U.S. and European 
populaces. 
And the cultural and historical similarities naturally affected the actions taken by 
the states in the political arena. The United States came to help Europe in both world 
wars. The U.S.-led Marshall Plan helped rebuild European economies and fostered the 
reconstruction of its damaged political systems. Furthermore, the integration of the 
European countries, which would eventually bring prosperity and peace to the continent, 
was also initiated. However, the most important reinforcing factor that bound the states 
together in a unique transatlantic alliance was the fact that they had a common enemy — 
the Soviet Union. And, in that context, NATO was to play a crucial role: where the 
danger was clear to everyone, NATO would provide collective security for all the 
Alliance countries.53
Despite their unity in facing the common and imminent danger from the Soviet 
Union, the Alliance’s history is not free of crises. Considerable tension stemmed from 
Europe’s worry that the United States might return to isolationism. America became 
annoyed by Europe’s lack of investment in defense.54 In 1956, there was the Suez Canal 
crisis; from 1957 to 1973, the Vietnam War; in 1961 came Khrushchev’s ultimatum; in 
1963, the Elysee Treaty crisis; and, in 1966, France’s withdrawal from NATO’s military  
 
 
53 Tim Garden, The Future of European–American Relations. 
<http://www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/writings/ articles/2004/04062323eljr.html> (accessed 1 February 2006). 
54 Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, Inc., 2003), p. 24. 
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structure. Those were some of the key turning points in the history of the transatlantic 
Alliance. Nonetheless, with each one, the Alliance managed to survive and kept its 
relevance in confronting the danger of the common enemy. 
In its overall history, the decade of the 1990s proved especially significant to the 
fate of the Alliance. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the end of 
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the transformation of the former communist 
states were the main cornerstones of that era. Accordingly, the question that ultimately 
emerged was: Now that there is no longer a single, clearly identifiable enemy, will the 
NATO Alliance continue to exist? The answer came from the Balkans. The instability 
created by the breakup of the former Yugoslavia meant that the Alliance would remain 
relevant. And, in 1999, as it carried out the Kosovo campaign, NATO found itself in the 
first war of its history.55
Today, NATO, the most developed institutional form of the Atlantic Alliance, is 
bigger and busier than ever. Although, in the common view of the public, the Alliance 
gave “the impression of being merely a collection of guns and bombs to deal with the 
Soviet Union,” after the Cold War ended, it proved that it was not simply a military 
alliance, but a long-term alliance that consisted of members who shared the same values. 
That does not mean, however, that the fundamental structures of the security 
environment that bound each side to the other did not change dramatically after Cold 
War. “The Cold War political system had rested on three pillars:  the Soviet presence in 
the east, the American presence in the west, and the constraints on German power.” With 
the end of Cold War, one of those pillars collapsed. Many people thought that those 
developments marked the beginning of the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance. And many 
questions were asked about the future potential of NATO. “Why, now that the Soviet 
threat had vanished, would the Americans stay in Europe?” “What would become of the 
limits on German power, despite the fact that the Germans were certainly not talking 





                                                
constraints that remained?” Undoubtedly, the fundamental conditions changed and, not 
surprisingly, in the beginning the emerging system was not particularly stable.56
The United States emerged as the only superpower from the Cold War era; and 
today, no other nation, or even several nations together, can challenge its military might 
and power. Given that reality, the United States felt that it was no longer bound to 
consider its allies, to the same degree it had been during the Cold War, when making 
decisions and taking action. On the other hand, Europeans felt they had never been safer, 
and that what they had, with the ending of the Cold War, was a more united and peaceful 
homeland. Thus, in some sense, perhaps psychological, they also were no longer as 
strongly connected as in the Cold War era to their defender. Now they could more readily 
pursue their different destinies and increase their vocalization of their individual 
country’s concerns. 
For many observers, the time for the great Alliance was over, or, at least, nearly 
over. Thus, to some degree, despite existing struggles and differences, the events in the 
Balkans can be said to have saved the relevance of the alliance. And as a result, NATO, 
the most developed and strongest voice of Alliance unity, experienced a great 
transformation. A coordinated and faithful effort on both sides of the Atlantic resulted in 
NATO’s continued relevance in a new security environment that was, and is, full of new 
dangers and threats. One thing that was certain for everybody was that the Alliance 
would remain, not merely as a collection of guns, but far more, and, most probably, also 
in the future. That was the feeling then, before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and subsequent 
developments, especially the Iraq War, created the “gravest crisis” in its long history for 
the transatlantic Alliance.57
In this chapter, my aim is to reflect the current situation of transatlantic relations 
in regard to their strategic cultures. There are many different views of the nature and 
causes of the transatlantic crisis. According to its proponents, the crisis was a product of 
 
56 March Trachtenberg, “The Future of the Western Alliance: An Historian’s View,” p. 1. 
<http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/columbia.doc> (accessed 2 February 2006).  
57 Henry Kissinger, “NATO’s Split: Atlantic Alliance is in its Gravest Crisis,” San Diego Union 
Tribune, 16 February 2003. <http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/useur/kissinger(sdut).html> 
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the Bush Administration: there is no need to worry about the U.S.–European partnership. 
Others argue that the Bush Administration was not such a major factor, rather the 
changing environment and the United States’ gain asymmetrically of huge power played 
the major role in bringing about the divergence. Yet another argument finds that different 
threat perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic, especially after 9/11, led the way to the 
gravest crisis.58 In this regard, analyzing the official American and European documents 
will help to understand the differences, similarities, and strategic cultures represented in 
the various viewpoints. Thus, at the end, it will help to see the current picture more 
clearly. 
B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY 
According to the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, the President is 
required to submit a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United 
States to the U.S. Congress. The National Security Strategy’s (NSS) primary purpose is 
to define the global interests, goals, and objectives that are essential to the national 
security of the United States, and to legitimatize further actions taken by the President in 
that context.59
President Bush released his National Security Strategy on 18 September 2002, as 
a response to the attacks of 11 September, which were mainly responsible for the content 
and tone of the document. Although a NSS is not a particular policy implementation, it 
has vital importance as a guide and rationalization for actual policy choices of a U.S. 
administration.60 Europe responded a year later with its own security statement, “A 
Secure Europe in a Better World,” the first official document of its kind. Its stated goal 
was to “reassert [the] EU’s common strategic vision and to strengthen its common will 
 
58 Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia, “Power, War and Public Opinion: Thoughts 
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for action in the realm of security.”61 By the same token, the “ESS [European Security 
Strategy] aims to address the weakest link in Europe’s role as an emerging global power: 
the connection between its lofty objectives and its uncoordinated policy instruments.”62 
Taken together, both documents were important attempts to formulate their views in a 
formal and more structured way. Consequently, a comparison of the documents is helpful 
to better understand the current and future state of transatlantic relations.63
In some aspects, the documents are similar, especially in their perceptions of the 
threats and the overall security environment at the end of the Cold War and after 9/11. 
The documents differ, however, in their views about the proper course of action to take in 
response to those threats. By the end of the Cold War, the United States had emerged as 
the strongest military power in the world. Still today no other nation, or even nations in 
total, can even dream of challenging its military might. Given that reality, the U.S. 
Security Strategy reflects the authority and strength of the United States and refers to its 
military might as the best means of resolving contemporary security problems. On the 
other hand, lacking America’s military strength and believing it impossible to acquire 
such strength in the near future, the EU deliberately shaped its Security Strategy to reflect 
quite different proper responses to today’s security threats. In this chapter, six main 
aspects of the two documents will be compared: the security environment; perceived 
responsibilities; strategic objectives; threat perceptions; strategies; and international 
cooperation, unilateralism versus multilateralism.  
1. The Security Environment 
a. The NSS 
The NSS addresses two important features of the contemporary 
international order that are mainly the products of the ending of the Cold War. In that 
 
61 Alson J.K. Bailes, “The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History,” SIRPI Policy Paper 
No.10, available at: <http://www.sipri.org/contents/editors/publications/ESS_PPrapport.pdf>, accessed 30 
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context, 9/11 has a special significance: it is not the beginning of new era, but rather a 
magnifying glass for viewing an ongoing progress that began much earlier.64 The NSS 
sees “the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the World Trade Center as the bookends of 
a long transition period”65 in the history of the global security environment. 
One of the NSS’ initial features — the celebration of the Cold War victory 
is a positive one — particularly in terms of the United States’ current position of power.66 
President Bush’s NSS cover letter opens with a hint of the general U.S. outlook on the 
current international order, noting that “the great struggle between liberty and 
totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom.”67 It is this tone 
that will dominate the entire NSS text. For Bush, the United States has “a single 
sustainable model for the success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.”68 In its 
oblique recognition of the United States’ unequalled global power, the NSS gives all the 
credit for those values to the United States and, by putting the United States in a position 
of championing them, sees a big opportunity for spreading those values throughout the 
world. 
According to the NSS, a second dimension of the international order — 
the evolution of the security environment since the end of Cold War — is a negative one. 
“The clear-cut confrontation with the Soviet Union has been replaced by a more complex, 
more uncertain, and hence more dangerous environment.”69 In this new environment, 
Bush points out; the real threats come not from militarily and economically powerful 
enemies with large and strong armies, but from rogue states and terrorism. “Now, 
shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for 
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less than it costs to purchase a single tank.”70 In the NSS’ analysis of the new security 
environment, 9/11 was no doubt the turning point in the United State’s realization of the 
full and true picture, as Condoleezza Rice later pointed out: 
[1 October 2002] 9/11 crystallized our vulnerability. It also threw into 
sharp relief the nature of the threats we face today. Today’s threats come 
less from massing armies than from small, shadowy bands of terrorists— 
less from strong states than from weak or failed states. And after 9/11, 
there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat 
to our security—a threat as great as any we faced during the Civil War, the 
so-called “Good War,” or the Cold War.71
Because, in its assessment of the new security environment, the NSS sees 
the danger as coming from outside, it puts the United States inevitably in a new kind of 
war, a war against terrorism with global reach. As Bush notes: 
Our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and 
rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit 
and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The 
conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, 
and at an hour, of our choosing.72
b. The ESS 
In its assessment of the security environment, the ESS shares some of its 
U.S. counterpart’s perspectives. The ESS admits that, since the end of the Cold War, the 
United States has been the dominant military actor in the international system. But as the 
European community, in the ESS, points out, in response, “no single country is able to 
tackle today’s complex problems on its own.”73 The ESS also recognizes the complex 
and interdependent danger posed by the current system: “the post–Cold War environment 
is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of the 
security are indissolubly linked.”74 Those circumstances “increased the role of non-state 
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groups in the international arena and the danger posed by them have also increased EU’s 
vulnerability on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and 
other fields.”75
Apart from these similarities, the ESS and the NSS differ in their 
judgment on major points. First, unlike the NSS, the ESS credits European integration, 
not the Cold War victory, as the most important feature of the current security 
environment.  
The contrasting world order is not found in the Cold War period, but in the 
violence of the first half of the twentieth century. Hence, the ESS fails to 
grant either the end of the Cold War, or 9/11, for that matter, the decisive 
meaning as the American document does.76
This differentiation in the essence of the international order assessments 
inevitably affects the positions taken by both sides. Whereas the ESS admits the current 
threats posed by the security environment, the “EU does not see itself being engaged in a 
new war.”77 Furthermore, while America faces an existential threat to its security, 
according to Rice, the first sentence of the ESS speaks for the collective union of nations: 
“Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free.”78
It is clear, therefore, that the two documents have different ideological 
approaches to the global security environment. Their main difference is at the core of the 
NSS and the ESS: while the United States claims to be at war against terrorism and feels 
an existential threat to its security, on the other side of Atlantic, Europe perceives itself as 
being more secure than ever. Thus, the two documents begin with a significantly different 
perception of the same security environment. Consequently, they are not likely to have 
similar reactions to security threats, unless their outlooks change as they learn from 
material incidents and interactions with each other. 
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2. Perceived Responsibilities 
a. The NSS 
In the chapter, Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity, the NSS makes 
clear what the United States stands for, as it makes this declaration: 
[T]he United States must defend liberty and justice because these 
principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns 
these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. . . . America must 
stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity.79  
As a result of an assessment based on “Cold War triumphalism,”80 
represented in the NSS, the United States claims a global responsibility with no 
geographical limits in the new security environment. The Cold War era left the U.S. in a 
dominant position not only militarily but also in the sense of moral values that only it 
could represent. In that context, seeing 9/11 as an attack on its freedom and its values 
urged American internal order to defend the foundation of American national greatness 
which depends on them. Furthermore, “protecting and further distributing the fruits of 
Cold War victory plays a vital role in defining the U.S. National Security Strategy.”81
Embodying lessons from our past and using the opportunity we have 
today, the national security strategy of the United States must start from 
these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty.82
b. The ESS 
The ESS is not as clear or as expansive as the NSS in defining the EU’s 
perceived responsibilities in the international system. The most important feature that 
emerges is the EU’s reluctance to take its responsibility for global security as far as the 
United States does. Thus, “while sharing the aim of democracy promotion in principle, 
the ESS does not weigh in on defence of liberalism to the extent the American document 
does.”83
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On that point, from a realist perspective, the position taken by the EU 
document could be better understood. Compared to the NSS, which never mentions 
energy dependence and speaks from a position of strength with a tone of authority, the 
ESS reflects the EU’s weakness as compared to its transatlantic partner. The EU gives 
special concern to the competition for natural resources and the growing energy 
dependency. Hence, instead of democracy promotion all around the world, which seems 
beyond the EU’s power in its calculation, the ESS mainly advocates the maintenance of 
regional stability focused mainly in the European region and the Middle East.84 Although 
on its first page, the ESS notes “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for 
global security and in building a better world,” it argues that Europe does not share the 
same level of responsibility perceived by NSS. The ESS clarifies its approach, stating 
that “even in an era of globalization, geography is still important.”85
3. Strategic Objectives 
a. The NSS 
The NSS devotes its entire first page and part of the second to defining its 
strategic objectives. In very clear, straightforward language, it states that “the aim of this 
strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.” It then defines three main 
pillars of this strategy: “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other 
states, and respect for human dignity.” After establishing the strategy’s general outlook, 
the NSS continues by listing eight strategic objectives the United States will do to 
achieve its overall goal: 
1. champion aspirations for human dignity; 
2. strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks 
against us and our friends; 
3. work with others to defuse regional conflicts; 
4. prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with 
weapons of mass destruction; 
5. ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free 
trade; 
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6. expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the 
infrastructure of democracy; 
7. develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global 
power; and 
8. transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges 
and opportunities of the twenty-first century.86
b. The ESS 
Although it takes a more positive position in its assessment of the security 
environment, the ESS admits that the risk of future threats will increase if no action is 
taken. Hence, the EU embraces three strategic objectives “to defend its security and 
promote its values.”87
1. Addressing the Threats: This objective has special value as a response to 
American complaints about the EU’s reluctance to take responsibility or to 
share the burden. The EU acknowledges its contribution in tackling the 
key threats as a response to 9/11, namely, the adoption of a European 
Arrest Warrant, long-term policies against proliferation, interventions in 
regional conflicts, and putting failed states back on their feet, including in 
the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the DRC. Within that context, the EU also 
embraces a global approach in defining the nature of the threats. “In an era 
of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are 
near at hand…The first line of defense will often be abroad.” But the ESS 
also cautiously draws a line: “none of the new threats is purely military; 
nor can any be tackled by purely military means.”88
2. Building Security in our Neighborhood: While embracing a global 
approach to define the current challenges and preferring to deal with them 
through a cooperative effort with others, geography is still an important 
matter for the EU’s strategic culture. Without a safe homeland, the EU can 
not play a vital role in global affairs. In this regard, three issues are 
especially significant: the EU’s enlargement by promoting a ring of well-
governed countries, resolution of the Arab/Israel conflict, a strategic 
priority for Europe, and a continued engagement with its Mediterranean 
partners.89
3. An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism: Crediting 
European integration in its assessment of the current international system, 
the ESS cares much more for multilateralism than its American 
 
86 NSS, pp. 1–2. 
87 ESS, p. 6. 
88 ESS, pp. 6–7.  
89 ESS, pp. 7–8.   
 
34 
                                                
counterpart. The EU defines its objective as “the development of a 
stronger international society, well functioning international institutions 
and a rule-based international order.” Furthermore, it stresses two 
important features not mentioned in the NSS in the same manner. First, the 
EU defines the United Nations Charter as the “fundamental framework for 
international relations.” Second, it embraces the transatlantic relationship 
as one of the core elements of the international system and, by the same 
token, it sees NATO as the institutionalized expression of this relationship. 
NATO is not credited to the same degree in the NSS.90
4. Threat Perceptions 
a. The NSS 
In the NSS threat analysis, “the gravest danger to the United States lies at 
the crossroads of radicalism and technology,” in other words, the combination of global 
terrorism supported by rogue states and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).91 
Although the tone of the document mainly emphasizes the threat coming from terrorism, 
the NSS mentions other issues as well: the return of great-power rivalries, arms races, and 
regional conflicts and poverty. On the other hand, none of these are perceived as real 
threats in the contemporary international order. They have importance only to the degree 
that they stimulate the real threat, the “terrorism-tyrants-WMD” triangle.92
The threat analysis and the tone of the U.S. document are a reflection of 
the affects of 9/11 within the U.S. security culture. In the words of the NSS, 
The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global 
reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or 
ideology. The enemy is terrorism — premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against innocents.93
The shock of the 9/11 attacks, which created a pressure to act and punish 
terrorists as soon as possible, also created urgency in the NSS’s threat assessment. 
Considering the attention given to the threat coming from terrorism, the lack of a deep 
analysis is very remarkable. However, the NSS credits the organizational and operational 
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character of terrorist organizations as more dangerous. The threat created by terrorism is 
not clear, and open societies like the United States, despite their power, are much more 
vulnerable to an elusive enemy of shadowy networks. 94
According to the NSS, a second significant threat is the threat from rogue 
states. Even though the NSS outlines the features of the rogue states, the ambiguity of the 
tone is striking. The NSS mostly assesses rogue states according to their leaders’ profiles: 
they are irrational and eager to take risks and, hence, are much more dangerous. The 
danger is very clear and imminent, according to the NSS threat assessment. There is no 
time to lose and failure to act in time is also very dangerous.95
b. The ESS 
In its threat assessment, the ESS, at some points, shares the general 
outlook of the NSS. Having assumed that a large-scale conflict is unlikely, the ESS 
defines the current threats as “more diverse, less visible, and less predictable.” Within 
that context, the EU faces five main threats: terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional 
conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.96 However, the ESS differs from the NSS in 
its attempt to determine the nature of the threats and to find proper solutions to the 
genesis of observed problems. 
The proliferation of WMD is assessed as potentially the greatest danger to 
EU security. In this regard, the ESS defines two concerns: first, the possibility of a WMD 
arms race, especially in the Middle East; and second, the most dangerous scenario, 





94 Berenskoetter, p. 7. 
95 Ibid., p. 8. 
96 ESS, pp. 3–4. 
97 ESS, p. 4. 
 
36 
                                                
Although it does not clearly define “terrorism,” the ESS does classify it, as 
“a growing strategic threat to the whole Europe.” Unlike the NSS, the ESS not only pays 
attention to terrorist methods, but also to the motivations. By the same token, the ESS 
goes one step farther: it internalizes some of the causes, whereas the NSS chooses to 
externalize them.98
The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to 
violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include 
the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the 
alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is 
also a part of our own society.99
In its threat assessment, the ESS, to some degree, shares the global 
outlook of the NSS. The ESS admits that regional conflicts have an impact on European 
interests, as they occur nearer to the continent. Regional conflicts also have a special 
significance because they can lead to terrorism, state failure, and organized crime. They 
may also enhance the demand for WMD. Hence, the ESS considers dealing with the older 
problems of regional conflicts as a means to better manage the elusive new threats. 
Organized crime is also another security concern of the EU, since Europe is a prime 
target for organized crime that can have links with terrorism. According to the ESS, state 
failures are also crucial, since they fuel organized crime and terrorism and increase 
regional instability.100
In sum, the ESS assesses the new threats as dynamic and often distant, just 
as the NSS does. But it does not see the threats as imminent, as the American document 
does. Although, in the opening pages of the ESS, it acknowledges the view that Europe is 
now safer than ever, the EU tries to establish a careful balance:101
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Taking these different elements together — terrorism committed to 
maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, 
organized crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatization of 
force — we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.102
5. Strategies 
a. The NSS 
Based on its assessment of the security environment and its threat 
perceptions, the NSS outlines a grand strategy: to create a balance of power that favors 
freedom and will protect the national interests of America and the values that give 
America its strength. As defined by Rice, this strategy has three main pillars: 
1. The United States will defend the peace by opposing and preventing 
violence by terrorists and outlaw regimes. 
2. The United States will preserve the peace by fostering an era of good 
relations among the world’s great powers. 
3. The United States will extend the peace by seeking to extend the benefits 
of freedom and prosperity across the globe.103
Because it analyzes the current system from the perspective of Cold War 
triumphalism, the United States perceives a great opportunity to protect and foster the 
fruits of that victory. Within that context, the NSS views democracy and free enterprise 
as the central issues of its agenda, since they are perceived as the only path to national 
strength and global peace. Hence, the NSS, in chapters VI and VII, develops two 
approaches to address those issues. The two chapters, taken together, are designed to 
show how the United States can achieve those goals. The methods discussed in Chapter 
VI are intended, as the title indicates, to “Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth 
through Free Markets and Free Trade.” Chapter VII deals with the structural basis for 
achieving the overall goal: “Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and 
Building the Infrastructure of Democracy.”104
 
102 ESS, p. 5. 
103 Rice, Ibid. 
104 NSS, pp. 17, 21. 
 
38 
                                                
Interestingly, the tone of the NSS changes when it begins to deal with 
terrorism.105 In its internal calculation of the risks from terrorist groups, especially those 
supported by rogue states, and their desire to acquire and use WMDs, the level of anxiety 
manifested in the NSS itself seems to increase. As a response to U.S. domestic 
demand,106 President Bush clearly reveals his own anxiety in his cover letter: “We cannot 
defend America and our friends by hoping for the best…. History will judge harshly 
those who saw the coming danger but failed to act … the only path to peace and security 
is the path of action.”107 In its threat assessment, the NSS concludes that Cold War 
deterrence strategies are useless considering the nature of the current threats posed by 
terrorism and, therefore, it legitimatizes preemptive action:108
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more 
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, 
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. 
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United 
States will, if necessary, act preemptively.109
To respond to current threats while at the same time deterring and 
preventing them, the NSS mostly advises a continued dependence on U.S. military 
strength which, according to the NSS, succeeded in preserving the peace in the past. Here 
is where NSS is caught up in the Cold War paradigm that “a global U.S. military 
presence is fundamental to making the United States more secure.”110 From that 
perspective, the NSS then concludes that “It is time to reaffirm the essential role of 
American military strength. We must build and maintain our defences beyond 
challenge.”111 Relying on its unchallengeable military power and reading the world from 
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a military–technological approach cause over-militarization in the U.S. foreign policy, 
and carry the danger in which military strategy replaces all strategy.112
b. The ESS 
Although there are similarities in their assessments of the current security 
environment and the new threats posed by it, the ESS and the NSS differ in their 
outlining of the appropriate strategies needed to meet those challenges.113 Whereas the 
United States prefers military solutions and a preemptive approach, the EU prefers 
mostly soft-power solutions and prefers to cope with the threats in a comprehensive way. 
The EU prefers to create long-term solutions to the underlying causes of the actions 
generally called “threats,” such as terrorist attacks. Thus, the “EU does not address issues 
as security problems, but as governance, development, environmental issues, etc., unless 
they pose an effective politico-military threat.”114 It is evident that the solutions the EU 
offers differ considerably from those of the United States.  
In the consideration of the ESS as a response to the U.S. document, it is 
obvious that each word was apparently selected carefully and must be analyzed from that 
perspective. In its response to the current security environment, the ESS shares one point 
of the NSS: it acknowledges the need to adapt to the nature of current threats and it 
recognizes that “the first line of defence will often be abroad.” That point, however, 
marks the end of the documents’ similarity and the beginning of their differentiation. 
Although it recognizes the reality that the danger is greater if no action is taken, the EU 
has developed its own approach: “[W]e should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. 
Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.”115
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The concepts of preemption and prevention play a major role in the U.S.– 
EU estrangement. Another important issue that increases the separation is the use of 
military tools in dealing with today’s threats. Although both documents acknowledge the 
need for action before a threat fully emerges, they differ in their perceptions of the 
appropriate time for action and in their methodology in dealing with problems. Whereas 
the United States prefers militarily solutions, the EU defines a different position: “[N]one 
of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. 
Each requires a mixture of instruments.”116 In addition, even when it notes the necessity 
of using the military, the ESS refers to the post-conflict phase carefully specifies using 
“military instruments” to “restore” order, not “change” the order.117 Furthermore, the 
ESS makes clear that the European Union is ready and “particularly well equipped to 
respond to such multi-faceted situations,” with the appropriate tools, mostly stemming 
from soft-power applications.118 On the other hand, the ESS clearly states the EU’s “need 
to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust 
intervention.”119 Finally, the ESS seems intended, in part, to convince the United States 
that the EU is not confined only to soft-power thinking. The EU believes that, while 
standing ready to use hard-power solutions when they are inevitable, it can use other 
tools to prevent the need for military applications.120
6. International Cooperation: Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism 
a. The NSS 
The NSS develops two main dimensions stemming from its analysis of the 
security environment: a normative dimension and a practical dimension. First, 
recognizing that terrorism as a clear enemy of freedom, the NSS declares that it is a 
responsibility and an obligation for all free nations to actively fight against that common 
enemy. In doing so, however, since the enemy is clearly defined as a common enemy of 
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all humanity, the NSS reflects a U.S. “with-us or against-us” point of view. On the other 
hand, the NSS recognizes the United States’ need for practical support from others, in 
regard to intelligence, law enforcement, and the disruption of terrorist financing. Thus, 
the NSS encourages regional partners to make a coordinated effort.121
In the NSS’ overall assessment, 9/11 plays a key role in its explanation of 
and references to the “new” security environment and international order, in which, as 
Bush says in his cover letter, “great powers” do not “continually prepare for war” with 
each other, since they are “united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos.”122 
Hence, the NSS sees a new opportunity for cooperation and strategic relationships, 
especially with other great powers, Russia, India, and China. The NSS also perceives 
democracies all over the world as natural allies. In this scenario, the NSS gives special 
value to Canada and Europe, since “There is little of lasting consequence that the United 
States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and 
friends in Canada and Europe.”123 Although the NSS outlines a special U.S. approach to 
Europe, it is not to the same degree as European document does for the United States. 
The position taken by the NSS on NATO and the EU are significant: the EU, for 
example, is seen as only an economic entity, not a strategic partner. 
Europe is also the seat of two of the strongest and most able international 
institutions in the world: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
which has, since its inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-
European security, and the European Union (EU), our partner in opening 
world trade.124
The NSS’ detailed assessment from the perspective of international 
cooperation, however, suggests a somewhat different picture than that drawn by Bush in 
his cover letter:  
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We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, 
better world alone.…The United States is committed to lasting institutions 
like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization 
of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances.… 
In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously.125
Despite above statement, the overall language of NSS situates America as 
the natural, self-sufficient world leader, whose every action will be based on “the union 
of its values and national interests.” There are no implications of any interest in an 
equally balanced multilateralism. “Coalitions of the willing” are, in that context, merely a 
reflection of the NSS’ central doctrine: they will be formed and will last only as long as 
they serve the interests of the United States of America. This central understanding 
becomes more evident when we look at what the NSS says about important long- 
standing international organizations.  
First, the NSS says little about the role of the UN in international relations, 
though it is mentioned in regard to specific cases and issues in which it could prove 
useful to the United States’ interests. Furthermore, in the view of the NSS, there is no 
need to get authorization from the UN Security Council for NATO’s military actions, 
since NATO’s legitimacy lies in its own mandate, which gives the United States much 
more authority. Furthermore, the NSS rejects all possible international constraints, 
indirectly, in the case of the UN, and directly, in regard to the International Criminal 
Court’s jurisdiction.126
In sum, in stating that the foundation of American strength is at home, the 
NSS outlines clearly the American position: 
While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the 
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to 
exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such 
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b. The ESS 
In its discussion of international cooperation, the ESS is decisive in 
favoring multilateralism much more than the U.S. document. First, in a section entitled 
“An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism,” the ESS refers to that as 
one of its strategic objectives. In essence, the EU commits itself to uphold and develop 
international law. The main difference between the two documents in regard to 
multilateralism stems from their varying interpretations of the mandates authorizing the 
use of force.128 The U.S. text views the NATO mandate as sufficient for military action, 
but states emphatically that the United States is not bound by that completely: “we will 
not hesitate to act alone.” Unlike the U.S. view, the ESS leaves no room for alternatives 
in regard to multilateral versus unilateral action: “International cooperation is a 
necessity.”129 The ESS also clarifies the EU position on the international system: 
The fundamental framework for international relations is the United 
Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities 
and to act effectively, is a European priority.130
There are other differences between the two documents. While the U.S. 
text assesses the EU as primarily an economic partner and gives special importance to 
NATO as the primary security institution, the ESS devotes little space to NATO and 
considers the EU a strategic partner of the United States. It suggests cooperating with 
other powerful countries, such as Japan, China, Canada, Russia, and India. In brief, a core 
element in the ESS — the sense that the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the 
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Although actual real-world policy implementations tend to be different from 
policy statements in official published documents, the latter are nonetheless important for 
the light they shed on the strategic cultures within which policy options are developed. 
Before reaching any conclusions about the comparableness of the NSS and the ESS, it is 
crucial to recall the circumstances under which they were developed. The NSS was a 
product of the 9/11 attacks, which deeply hurt America’s national psyche. Hence, its tone 
and preferred choices for dealing with the terrorist threat reflect the immediate reaction of 
that devastated hegemonic nation. The lack we find in the NSS of any in-depth analysis 
stemmed from two factors. One was the United States’ need to take quick action and 
thereby somewhat relieve the national anxiety while, at the same time, legitimatizing 
further actions. A second contributing factor was the existing, structurally driven, 
international system, in which the United States enjoys an unchallengeable position, 
especially with respect to its military might. Given its derivation from within that context, 
NSS is a living document that is open to modification under changing circumstances, not 
as a strict guideline that binding all U.S. policies. The ESS, on the other hand, was 
Europe’s, or at least the EU Council’s, response to the NSS. Its primary purpose was 
twofold: to make clear the EU’s position on critical issues and to act as a guideline for 
creating solidarity among its member states. It, too, is a living document and will be 
shaped, therefore, by lessons learned and by the EU’s interaction with its U.S. 
counterpart. 
Considering the circumstances in which the NSS and the ESS emerged, and 
taking into account the historical stereotype of transatlantic relations — which includes 
many crises even given their mutual defense against imminent danger from the Soviet 
Union — one can only conclude that these two documents are not the “divorce” 
documents of the United States and Europe. The real-world situation is stated in both 






                                                
accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in 
Canada and Europe.”132 The ESS raises the level of unity even higher by stating that “the 
transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable.”133
Essentially, the central difference between the two lies in their assessment of the 
nature of the threats and their preferred methods for dealing with them. In their 
assessment of the security environment, both see the inherent dangers. And this notional 
overlap, in effect, situates the two sides of the Atlantic on the same side in deal with the 
common enemy. Ironically, this is also the point, however, where the two texts diverge. 
Where the United States perceives the danger as imminent and  military application as the 
best tool to deal with the problem, the European Union perceives a less immediate 
danger, and finding that the nature of the threat allows the use of more multifaceted, soft-
power tools, and it takes a more holistic approach, rejecting immediate militarily 
solutions. Another critical divergence between the texts is their attitude toward 
international cooperation. Given their diverse histories and current status, the United 
States and the European Union have evolved equally diverse approaches to the 
international system. Whereas the United States emphasizes that it will act alone if 
necessary, the EU favors multilateralism with no exceptions. This stance is a natural 
consequence of European integration which Europeans perceive as the major 
achievement that brought peace and prosperity to the European continent. 
Since the real differences between two security strategies, the NSS and the ESS, 
stem from methodologies, they are not, in essence, unmanageable. Especially since a 
careful examination reveals a mutual core of solidarity in the two sides’ perception of the 
shared values, interests, and threats they face. Other factors lose their relative importance 
in light of these essential roots. Furthermore, we may see new developments in the 
transatlantic relations if the European Union achieves one of its principal goals: 
 
 
132 NSS, p. 25. 
133 ESS, p. 13. 
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The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the 
European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good 
in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with 
the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its 
capabilities and increase its coherence.134
 
 
134 ESS, p. 13. 
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IV. THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the dramatically changing security environment 
in its aftermath brought about a deep estrangement between the United States and its 
European allies. While enjoying its on-track transformation, the Alliance was shocked by 
one of the gravest crisis of its history — the U.S. instigation of the Iraq War. To extreme 
pessimists, this signaled the end of the long-lasting institutionalized form of the 
transatlantic Alliance, NATO. But to most observers, this was nothing new in the history 
of the Alliance. And now that the dust of the Iraq crisis has somewhat settled and things 
are back to normal, the real picture of the transatlantic Alliance and where it is headed 
can be seen more clearly.  
Thus, my goal in this chapter is to shed light on the nature of the crisis and its 
affect on the future of transatlantic relations. I will discuss, therefore, not only the strong 
ties between two sides but also the implications of the military-capabilities gap between 
them. While concluding that a divorce seems impossible in the near future, I will try to 
set forth the features of the new transatlantic bargain. 
A. CRISIS OVER THE IRAQ WAR: THE IMPACT OF 9/11, THE 
REACTION OF A HURT SUPERPOWER, AND LEADERSHIP 
FAILURES 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11, in a way that leaves no room for doubt, deeply 
affected the strategic cultures on both sides of the Atlantic. But, certainly, it made a 
greater impact on the mindset of Americans than that of Europeans. That does not mean, 
however, that Europeans did not share Americans’ feelings. 
Europeans reacted with a surge of horror, and identified totally with the 
United States. The overwhelming sentiment, as crystallized by Le Monde, 
was “Nous sommes tous américains.” The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization instantly invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history, 
branding this attack on the U.S. an attack on all NATO members. Some 
200,000 Berliners demonstrated spontaneously at the Brandenburg Gate to 
express their sympathy with America, and German businesses and 
individuals instantly contributed an astonishing $42 million to aid victims 
and survivors of 9/11. Chancellor Schröder pledged “unconditional 
solidarity” with the U.S. in the Bundestag; eulogized New York as the 
whole world’s “symbol of a refuge”; and risked his office by forcing a 
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vote of confidence to send German Special Forces to fight alongside 
Americans in Afghanistan. With this step, for the first time since 1945, 
German combat troops were deployed outside Europe. In addition, the 
German intelligence service gave Washington the clue that led to tracking 
down a “20th hijacker” who had not died in the 9/11 suicide attacks.135
Despite the initial solidarity between members of the Alliance, it did not last long. 
President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address categorized Iraq, North Korea, and Iran 
as an “axis of evil,” and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz stated that “from now 
on in any American military expedition the mission would determine the coalition, not 
vice versa.” These made a deep impact on Europeans. “The clear subtext was that for the 
Bush administration the transatlantic alliance, like Europe itself, was expendable.”136
Many argued that a break-up was already only a matter of time, not only because 
of the attitude of the current administration but also for deep structural reasons, stemming 
from the end of the Cold War and intensified by September 11 and its aftermath. “In this 
view, recent tensions are to some degree inevitable, and go beyond individual leaders and 
their personal styles.” The most important difference lay not in naming the threats but in 
the level of urgency coming from those threats, which deepened after 9/11 on both sides 
of the Atlantic.137  
Diverging U.S.–European threat perceptions were not new and they have 
been emerging since the end of the Cold War. Throughout the 1990s, U.S. 
policymakers often complained that Europe was preoccupied with its own 
internal transformation, and largely blind to the new global threats. 
However, the September 11 attacks on New York, Washington, and over 
Pennsylvania, as well as the still unsolved anthrax attacks of October 
2001, had a profound effect on America’s national psyche, and further 
widened the gap in U.S.–European threat perceptions and policy 
preferences for managing those threats.138
                                                 
135 Elizabeth Pond, “The Great Tragedy of NATO,” Internationale Politik (4 Jan 2003) 
<http://nps.blackboard.com/courses/1/NS3720_2006FA_Ph/content/_250629_1/The_Greek_Tragedy_of_N
ATO.htm> (accessed 3 February 2006).  
136 Ibid. 
137 Kristin Archick, “The United States and Europe: Possible Options for U.S. Policy,” CRS Report to 
Congress, updated 8 March 2005, p. 7. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/45188.pdf> (accessed 
3 February 2006). 
138 Ibid., p. 7. 
 
49 
                                                
To some degree, the Iraq crisis can be seen as a consequence of those well-rooted 
structural drives and America’s deeply injured national psyche, the psyche of the world’s 
most hegemonic nation. But what made Iraq so critical and pushed the Alliance toward a 
breakup, more than all the other factors put together, were the leadership failures. On the 
U.S. side, there was Bush’s “axis of evil” announcement; Wolfowitz’s “the mission 
defines the coalition”; Rumsfeld’s “I don’t do diplomacy” and “That is Old Europe; I am 
talking with New Europe.” Those are just a few examples; others included putting 
Germany in the same category as Libya and Cuba in a U.S. announcement. However, the 
U.S. leaders were not alone in this failure. On the German side, there was Schröder’s “no 
flexibility for accommodation of either American or European allies on the issue” and 
German Justice Minister Herta Däubler-Gmelin’s calling Bush’s Iraq campaign “an effort 
to divert American voters from domestic straits—and not[ing] that Hitler had also used 
this ploy.”139 But there was much more that deepened the crisis. 
President Bush took Schröder’s no-war appeal as insubordination and a 
personal affront. He pointedly did not send routine congratulations to 
Schröder on his reelection; the chancellor was not invited to Washington; 
when the two leaders came together at their next international meeting, 
Bush conspicuously turned his back on Schröder for all the TV cameras to 
record. Furthermore Rumsfeld ostracized his German counterpart at 
NATO meetings; German diplomats in the U.S. were frozen out of 
contacts. Even more, Defense Department adviser Richard Perle publicly 
called on Schröder to resign.140
All these and many more leadership failures on both sides worsened the crisis and 
made it perhaps the gravest crisis ever for the Atlantic Alliance, as there emerged a great 
estrangement on both sides. In sum, “the real story of the Iraq crisis was the toxic 
interaction of the two sides’ diplomatic approaches and the vicious circle they created 









                                                
opinion, whereas European leaders opposed the American policy. “Neither the Americans 
nor their European critics seemed to take into account the potential impact of their 
policies on the Atlantic alliance.”141
There is no doubt that the crisis over Iraq was one of the greatest crises of the 
Atlantic Alliance, but there was more dust and smog than real fire because of the failed 
attitudes or incompetence of leaders on both sides. The real question to be asked here is: 
In the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, are the emerging threats of the new security 
environment — namely, terrorism, the spread of WMD, failing or rogue states, organized 
crime, and environmental problems, etc. — and the existing economic, political, and 
historical ties developed around shared values still enough to bind the two sides of the 
Atlantic together, as they did in the past, against a common enemy? 
Although it is still too early to give a definitive answer to this question, I think the 
answer is yes. “Neither the United States nor Europe can adequately address such diverse 
concerns alone. Furthermore, the track record shows that they can accomplish much more 
in the world when they work together rather than at cross purposes and they will do so 
also in the future.”142
B. TIES THAT BIND THE TWO SIDES: AN UNTHINKABLE DIVORCE 
1. Shared Values and Public Opinion 
A careful examination of public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic certainly 
shows that “Americans are not from Mars . . . nor Europeans from Venus.” Both share 
the same values and want more to cooperate than to compete with one another. And they 
believe there are more causes for cooperation than for conflict.143 Here are some basic 
findings about public opinion on both sides. 
 
 
141 Philip H. Gordon and  Jeremy Shipiro, Allies at War (New York: McGraw Hill Publishers, 2004), 
156 
142 Archick, p. 3. 
143 Transatlantic Trends Surveys of 2003, 2004, and 2005 can shed some light on the different and 
similar views of U.S. and European public opinions along with their evolution in this period. Although 
2003 and 2004 show us the gap on some certain issues, 2005 reflects a closer U.S. and European view 
about critical issues. The evolution of public opinion in U.S. reflects the stretching affect of the Iraq War. 
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• Most significantly, despite a general misperception, there is no evidence of 
increased anti-Americanism in Europe. Europeans separate the Bush 
Administration from the United States in general in their assessment. 
Seventy-two percent of Europeans disapprove of the way President Bush 
is handling international policies. Thus the data suggests that Europeans’ 
criticism is aimed mostly at the current administration, not at the United 
States more generally.144 
• Americans and Europeans continue to have warm feelings toward one 
another.145 
• In the realm of multilateralism and international institutions, which are 
said to have played a deteriorating role in U.S. and European 
estrangement, a Chicago Council survey indicates that, like its European 
counterpart, there is substantial U.S. public support for collective decision 
making and for strengthening international organizations.146 
• In another problematic area, the legitimacy of the use of force, like 
Europeans, American public opinion gives credit to the UN Security 
Council as having all the right to authorize147 military action. The only 
exception is in a response to terrorism, but even in that case, determining 
that the danger as imminent is essential for using force without UN 
approval. 
• “Americans and Europeans have similar views of threats, but different 
impulses on how to respond to them.”148   
• Like most Americans (76 percent of Democrats, 69 percent of 
Republicans) who want to see a more active EU in world affairs, 70 
percent of Europeans want the EU to become a “superpower” like the 
United States. On the other hand, unlike some Americans’ fear, a large 
majority (80 percent) of Europeans want a more powerful EU to cooperate 




144 Transatlantic Trends–Key Findings 2005, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, p. 6. 
<http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/TTKeyFindings2005.pdf> (accessed 5 February 2006). 
145 Ibid., p. 7. 
146 Global Views 2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, The Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations, p. 8. <http://www.ccfr.org/globalviews2004/sub/pdf/Global_Views_2004_US.pdf> 
(accessed 5 February 2006). 
147 Ibid., p. 26. 
148 Transatlantic Trends–Key Findings 2003, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, p. 3 
<http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/2003_english_key.pdf> (accessed 5 February 2006).  
149 Transatlantic Trends–Key Findings 2005, pp. 4, 15, 16. 
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• Surprisingly, Europeans seem to embrace more than Americans (74 
percent to 51 percent) the “democracy promotion” that forms the 
centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s second-term foreign policy 
agenda. Furthermore, both Europeans and Americans strongly prefer “soft 
power” options to promote democracy.150 
• As solid proof of their shared values, “while Europeans and Americans 
look to deepen economic relations with China, a slim majority on both 
sides of the Atlantic agree that the U.S. and EU should limit economic 
relations with China because of human rights violations.”151 
• NATO is still essential for majorities in both the United States and 
Europe. While the EU considers a more global role for itself, NATO 
seems to continue to play an important role as a key forum for 
transatlantic security cooperation.152 
2. Security Environment 
The structural changes in the security environment in the aftermath of the Cold 
War and 9/11 are arguably the main reasons underlying the current transatlantic crisis 
concerning differences of threat perception and the means to deal with them. But in 
today’s security environment, “even without the Soviet threat to unite the two sides of the 
Atlantic more strictly, the United States and its European allies face a common set of 
challenges, which need to be dealt with in a cooperative action, from countering terrorism 
and WMD proliferation to ensuring the stability of the global financial markets.”153
When viewed within that context, the U.S. National Security Strategy and the EU 
Security Strategy shed light on how the United States and the European Union perceive 
the current security environment. In brief, the two documents mutually support each other 
in defining key threats, which puts the United States and the EU on the same side in the 
contemporary international system. 
Perceiving the threats of the new security environment from a similar perspective 
and accepting the complexity of the new challenges should generate a more cooperative 
effort by both sides, especially after the coldness of the Iraq crisis between Americans 
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and Europeans completely dissipates. Neither the United States nor Europe can 
adequately address such diverse challenges alone, but, for now, Europeans seem to 
embrace this reality more than Americans. There are already some signals, however, that 
Americans are also reaching that point. The U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Tom 
Ridge, for instance, acknowledged in January of 2005 at the European Policy Centre in 
Brussels, Belgium, that “security for both the United States and the European Union 
depends on collective action.” Furthermore, he announced that “the United States will 
establish a full-time attaché from the Department of Homeland Security to the European 
Union: 
This new position is not only symbolic of our commitment to increased 
cooperation, but, by having a direct link between the Secretary and 
negotiating partners across Europe, it will allow for constant 
communication on an operational level.154
3. Economic Interdependency 
One of the main, and perhaps the most complex and binding, pillars of the 
Transatlantic Alliance is the economic interdependency of the two sides, which has 
important implications for the future of general U.S.–EU relations. According to the EU’s 
official Web site, “The transatlantic economic relationship has grown strongly over 
recent years; the EU and the U.S. are now each other's main trading partners and account 
for the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world.”155 The transatlantic relationship 
defines the shape of the global economy; annual two-way flows of goods, services, and 
foreign direct investment exceed $1.1 trillion, while the total stock of two-way direct 
investment is over $1.6 trillion. U.S. and European companies are also the biggest 
investors in each other’s markets. That transatlantic economy employs 12 to 14 million 
workers.156
 
154 Tom Ridge, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, speech at the European Policy Centre in 
Brussels, Belgium, on 13 January 2005. <http://www.useu.be/Terrorism/USResponse/Jan1305RidgeUSEU 
Cooperation.html> (accessed 5 February 2006).  
155 The EU Official Website, “The EU's Relations with the United States of America.” 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/economic_relations> (accessed 6 February 2006). 
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Realizing the value of this irreplaceable economic partnership, leaders from both 
sides have sought ways to improve their already huge economic relationship. And though 
they live in a political era which has arguably seen one of the gravest crises in 
transatlantic relations, they continue to seek solutions for some ongoing economic 
disputes.157 Furthermore, other emerging great powers, such as China, and some 
relatively small but economically dynamic Asian countries now challenge the United 
States’s unique position of economic supremacy, and relatively, its European partners. 
The United States will not continue to dominate the world economy as it did in the 
past.158 That crucial factor also makes the huge U.S.–European economic partnership 
much more valuable and, in effect, eliminates, or at least lessens, the probability of a 
transatlantic divorce in the near future. 
C. THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE 
The Iraq War brought about one of the most severe transatlantic crises in NATO’s 
history, dividing Americans and Europeans from each other and among themselves. The 
question today is: Where should the Alliance go now? In that regard, the Iraq crisis offers 
two basic lessons, one for Europe and one for America. For Europeans, the lesson is that, 
“in military matters, there is only one superpower and it can go it alone if it has to. It is 
time to accept this fact and move on.” For Americans, the lesson is that “winning a peace 
is much harder than winning a war. Intervention is cheap in the short run but expensive in 
the long run. Furthermore, in the realm of essential nonmilitary tools for avoiding 
disorder or quagmire once the fighting stops — trade, aid, peacekeeping, international 
monitoring, and multilateral legitimacy — Europe is indispensable.”159
Today, the United States needs a functioning EU as much as an effective NATO. 
The challenges and strategic necessities of the twenty-first century make the United 
States more dependent on a strong and united European Union. A strong, more  
 
 
157 U.S. Department of State Official Website, “Strengthening the U.S.-EU Economic Partnership.” 
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2000), 175. 
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integrated, and outward-looking Europe can help the United States achieve its main 
foreign policy objectives: “defending the U.S. homeland, winning the ‘war on terror’ and 
promoting the spread of freedom and democracy around the world.”160
Basically, both sides need the other in areas in which they are weak. “Europe 
needs American military might; whereas the U.S. needs European civilian power.” Given 
these circumstances, a new transatlantic bargain, “one that redirects complementary 
military and civilian instruments toward common ends and new security threats” is 
crucial.161 A new bargain should place “the NATO–EU relationships at the core of the 
renegotiated partnership, and advocate a more equal sharing of responsibilities both 
within and outside of Europe.” This new bargain should include the following: 
a U.S. commitment to a strong and coherent Europe and a European 
commitment to building the EU as a partner rather than a rival to the 
United States; a U.S. pledge to give the European allies a larger decision-
making role, in exchange for a European pledge to do more to help ensure 
peace and security beyond Europe’s borders; and an increased European 
understanding that multilateral solutions often require the credible threat 
of force, in exchange for U.S. recognition of the benefits that 
multilateralism may bring in terms of helping to “legitimize” U.S. policies 
internationally.162
Hence, in order to get things back on track in their transatlantic relations, 
“Washington must shift course and accept multilateral conditions for intervention. The 
Europeans, meanwhile, must shed their resentment of American power and be prepared 
to pick up much of the burden of conflict prevention and post-conflict engagement.”163 
Furthermore, as the response to recent public-opinions that show a general support from 
both sides of Atlantic for “the promotion of democracy,” the United States “must make 
democracy a global cause” in order to reinvigorate the U.S. and European relationship. 
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The United States is clearly moving in that direction. President George W. Bush, 
“in his second-term inaugural speech, placed the promotion of democracy at the centre of 
the American foreign policy agenda.”164 Moreover, the Bush administration began its 
second term with “an ambitious diplomatic effort to change the tone and improve 
relations with Europe.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Paris in February 
2005, and President Bush flew to Europe three times in the first six months of his second 
term. Moreover, he became the first American president to officially visit the European 
Union, declaring in Brussels: “The alliance of Europe and North America is the main 
pillar of our security.”165
The realities basically changed the U.S. approach. A Pentagon-sponsored report 
in January 2006 shows that the Iraq War has stretched the United States military to the 
breaking point. “[S]tretched by frequent troop rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
Army has become a ‘thin green line’ that could snap unless relief comes soon.”166 In 
addition, the war [has] cost hundreds of billions of dollars, estranged partners in Europe 
and around the world, and reduced the willingness of the American people for a 
missionary foreign policy. It is hard to escape the paradox:  
Iraq, a classic war of choice, has constrained the Administration’s choices 
in its second term. Choices are further constrained by tax cuts, extravagant 
spending, and the absence of a policy to reduce U.S. dependency on 
imported oil. The result is that the United States is moving—haltingly, 
reluctantly, but inexorably—toward a more pragmatic and multilateral 
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In sum, losing its moral leadership will be one of the most important 
consequences of the Iraq War for the United States. Furthermore, a more integrated EU 
will emerge as a more capable partner as a consequence of Europe’s humiliation over 
Iraq.168 Although the old magic is gone, the alliance will be there, at least in the near 
future, and it will change into a more broadly based partnership.169
1. A New Bargain: From Collective Defense to Collective Security 
An analysis of the ongoing transformation of NATO since the end of the Cold 
War and its functions in the conflicts in the Balkans and Afghanistan along with 
dramatically changing security environment after terrorist attacks of 9/11 suggests that 
NATO still has a vital role in the contemporary international order. And that role seems 
to embrace the so-called “campaign against terrorism” as its new paradigm to the same 
degree as it embraced an anti-Soviet campaign during the Cold War.170
In the Cold War era, the Alliance was formulated only as a collective defense 
organization against a common threat. However, the basic setting in which the Alliance 
was established changed, and more elusive threats replaced the old one. Accordingly, 
since the end of Cold War, it has become more difficult to find appropriate strategies to 
handle the challenges of the new security environment. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 impelled NATO countries to create broadly based strategies in order to keep the 
Alliance relevant in this new era full of new threats. In realizing these challenges, the 
Alliance has undergone a major transformation to meet them. 
In this regard, the Allies have had a continued interest in keeping NATO alive and 
equipping it with the capability to handle the new security environment. Thus members 
formulated a new bargain which embraces a new role of collective security, while at the 
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same time keeping the basic commitment to collective defense at its core. As is clearly 
stated in the NATO Handbook, NATO’s central function is one of collective defense.171
NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all 
its members by political and military means in accordance with the North 
Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the United Nations Charter…. The 
fundamental principle underpinning the Alliance is a common 
commitment to mutual cooperation among the member states, based on 
the indivisibility of their security. Solidarity and cohesion within the 
Alliance ensure that no member country is forced to rely upon its own 
national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without 
depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign 
responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them to realize 
their essential national security objectives through collective effort. In 
short, the Alliance is an association of free states united in their 
determination to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and 
stable relations with other countries. 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Stephen Hadley, U.S. Deputy 
Adviser, made a similar affirmation.172
NATO’s core mission is the same today as it was at its founding: 
collective defense and consultation about threats to peace and security. 
NATO put this mission into new practice following the 11 September 
terrorist attacks…. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty became real that day in a 
new way, and one that should surely give pause to those who question 
NATO’s purposes. NATO’s core mission has not changed. What has 
changed is the source of the threats to our countries. 
Indeed, by the end of Cold War, the most important link in the transatlantic 
relations — having the Soviet Union as a common enemy — was replaced by the United 
States’ and Europe’s shared strategic interest in defeating global terrorism, preventing the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction, supporting economic growth and stability, and  
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preventing failed states and regional conflicts that would foster the threat of terrorism.173 
In that context, NATO still keeps its vital function as the main pillar of transatlantic 
security and the guarantor of European security.174
In the current security environment, because of Europe’s overall military 
weakness and the nature of the threats, NATO is indispensable for a stable Euro-Atlantic 
region. But Europe cannot be guaranteed safety if the Europeans neglect taking the steps 
necessary to meet the challenges coming from terrorism and instability abroad as its 
classical area of responsibility. As Senator Richard Lugar clearly stated, “The threat we 
face is global and existential. We need allies and alliances to confront it effectively. 
Those alliances can no longer be circumscribed by artificial geographic boundaries.”175 
This position was also emphasized by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson when he 
acknowledged terrorism as the main security challenge in the twenty-first century.176
Terrorism will be the first major security challenge in the 21st century -- 
probably a growing challenge, and quite possibly a much more lethal one. 
Second, as terrorism is becoming an increasingly global phenomenon, so 
our response must be global as well. And finally, NATO and its members 
must expand its responsibility as an essential platform for defence 
cooperation to become the primary means for developing the role of 
armed forces in helping to defeat the terrorist threat. 
In addition, Lord Robertson defined four main areas in which NATO can play a 
crucial role in dealing with terrorism: identification and detection of terrorist threats, 
protection of civilian and military infrastructure and populations, management of the 
consequences of possible future terrorist attacks, and preemptive military action.177
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Another main issue that must be addressed is the question of NATO’s ability to 
conduct “out-of-area operations,” part of NATO’s transformation efforts to meet current 
challenges. NATO can no longer deal effectively with the current threats while remaining 
in its classical Cold War operation area. Accordingly, the Alliance’s strategic concept of 
1999 established a new out-of-area role for NATO, through non–article 5 missions, while 
continuing to build collective security as the second pillar of the new transatlantic 
bargain.178
The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to 
guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of 
member states. The Alliance’s forces must therefore be able to deter and 
defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied 
nations and—in case of conflict—to terminate war rapidly by making an 
aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO 
forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence while 
conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations. 
Thus, while undergoing its post–Cold War transformation, NATO also 
accomplished crucial out-of-area and non–Article 5 missions such as IFOR, SFOR, and 
KFOR. In that regard, at the Prague Summit, an important cornerstone in Alliance 
history, Lord Robertson announced:179
First of all, we have reached agreement on the character of the new threats 
and on the best way that NATO and its members should respond to them. 
Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are two of 
the defining challenges of the twenty-first century. The NATO Allies 
acknowledged this by invoking Article 5 in response to the 9/11 attacks. 
And they did so again by sending forces to Afghanistan to fight al Qaeda 
and the Taliban. As a result, in 2002, we effectively buried the perennial 
debate on whether NATO could or should go “out-of-area.” 
In dealing with the challenges of the twenty-first century, it is obvious that NATO 
cannot play a crucial role if it stays within its Cold War responsibility area, continental 
Europe. Today Europe is safer; it has lost its feature of being the first line of defense. In 
the contemporary international order, the threats do not come from powerful state 
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enemies but from elusive global terrorist organizations that make classical strategies 
obsolete for dealing with them. Furthermore, in an era of globalization, conflicts tend to 
spread more swiftly and technological progress has decreased the importance of 
geography. As a natural result of its enlargement process, NATO’s members are now 
more vulnerable to threats coming from the Middle East and Northern Africa. The 
proliferation of missile technology now places most of them within range of ballistic 
missiles launched from those regions.180 As the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Nicholas 
Burns, points out;181   
NATO’s past was focused inward, on Cold War threats directed at the 
heart of Europe. NATO’s future is to look outward to the Greater Middle 
East to expand security in that arc of countries from South and Central 
Asia to the Middle East and North Africa—where the new challenges to 
global peace are rooted. 
Hence, it is no longer possible to assure security by implementing a static defense 
approach. Acknowledging this reality, NATO members accepted new conceptual 
foundations and created a NATO Response Force with global reach in order to actively 
engage in the current security environment. NATO has undergone a great transformation, 
from a regional defense alliance to an organization with a broad collective security role, 
refocused from the Euro-Atlantic region to a global scale. As Lord Robertson indicated, 
“Today, NATO is a problem solver. It must go where the trouble is. In today’s world, if 
we don’t go to the trouble, the trouble will come to you.”182
NATO has come a long way, not just in defining that new consensus, but 
in implementing it. From our anti-terrorist naval patrols in the 
Mediterranean to the stabilization force in Afghanistan, from our 
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism to measures to protect ourselves 
against chemical and biological attack. From slimming down our 
Command Structure to creating the new NATO Response Force and a  
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brand new Supreme Allied Command to drive transformation, this 
Alliance has fully embraced the need to evolve and adapt in line with the 
new strategic environment.183
However, NATO can only manage these challenges if solidarity and cooperation 
are established between the two sides of the Atlantic:184
Here lies the common transatlantic interest and the necessity for a new 
NATO in the twenty-first century. NATO will remain one of the key 
cornerstones for peace and stability…. Europe and America depend upon 
each other in their fight against the new threat. We are in the same boat 
because we want to defend the same thing: the freedom and security of our 
citizens, as well as our open democracies and human rights. These are the 
goals which we are both pursuing. These are the values which we share. 
2. The Implications of the Military Gap 
Ever since the beginning of the Transatlantic Alliance, the issue of Europe’s 
military weakness has proved to be one of the main problematic features in the relations 
between the United States and the Europeans. While the United States aimed to decrease 
the burden of its commitment to European defense and encouraged Europeans to do 
more, the war-worn countries of Europe focused on their post-war economic and political 
reconstruction while at the same time assuring a continuing American commitment. In 
that context, bargaining and burden-shifting emerged as their routine form of interaction. 
As Wallaje J. Thies points out in his 2003 book, Friendly Rivals, “NATO members 
sought to persuade their allies to do more so they themselves could do less – and not just 
once but again and again.”185
In the Cold War era, the practice of burden-shifting had not deeply affected the 
solidarity of the Alliance. The reason was twofold: first, the existence of an imminent 
huge military threat; and second, the continent of Europe was itself the first place to meet 
that danger. For these reasons, an American commitment to European defense was 
inescapable. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War and the dramatically changing 
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nature of the security environment altered the basic setting in which the Alliance had 
been formulated. Europe emerged as an integrated and more peaceful continent which 
had lost its status of being the first line of defence. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 further deteriorated America’s already declining focus on continental Europe. All 
these developments increased the question of the usability and future of NATO. And they 
left Europeans with no other choice but to improve their military capabilities in order to 
keep NATO alive and functional, to guarantee the continuity of American commitment, 
and to retain their ability to affect U.S. strategic decisions. 
In that context, the Europeans had already begun to develop a “European Security 
and Defense Policy” and a “Common Foreign and Security Policy” in an effort to reach a 
general consensus and form a common strategic culture. They quickly realized their 
relative military weakness in the events of Bosnia and Kosovo. Hence, they increased 
their commitment to developing their capabilities to, at best, catch up with the 
Americans, and, in practice, at least keep interoperability with them, and to manage 
“crisis management” on the continent. All in all, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the 
changes in the security environment in its aftermath dramatically increased the 
importance of achieving a European defense initiative for the sake of the future of 
Alliance.186
In 1999, NATO presented its Defense Capabilities Initiative at the Washington 
Summit, and the EU launched its “Headline Goal” initiative   at the December Helsinki 
European Council meeting. The initiative aimed to equip the EU with the ability to 
deploy 60,000 troops within sixty days, sustainable for one year. By doing so, the EU 
would successfully achieve required “Petersberg Tasks”: humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking or peace enforcement.187
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A year later, to meet the operational requirements established by the Headline 
Goal, a Capabilities Commitments Conference (CCC) was held under the title 
“Reinforcing Military Capabilities and Identifying Shortcomings.” During this meeting, 
EU members agreed on three main commitments: 100,000 personnel, 400 combat 
aircraft, 100 naval vessels. Furthermore, in November 2001, at a Capability Improvement 
Conference, EU members identified additional shortcomings under three main categories: 
force protection, logistics, and operational mobility. Accordingly, they developed a 
European Capability Action Plan and by the end of the year, they had resolved five of the 
fifty-five major identified shortfalls. As a result of this process, the May 2003 General 
Affairs and External Relations Council found that “the EU now has operational capability 
across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained [only] by recognized 
shortfalls.”188
In 2003, the EU adopted a European Security Strategy as its response to the 
changing security environment and, in May 2004, launched a new plan, the “Headline 
Goal 2010.” This plan aimed to give the EU “the ability by 2010 to respond with rapid 
and decisive action, applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis 
management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union.” To accomplish 
this, it identified “the following indicative list of specific milestones within the 2010 
horizon”:189
• the establishment of a civil–military cell with the capacity to rapidly set-
up an operation centre for a particular operation; 
• the establishment of the European Defence Agency in the field of defence 
capability development, research, acquisition, and armaments; 
• the implementation of EU Strategic lift joint coordination; 
• the development of a fully efficient European Airlift Command 
• the completion of rapidly deployable battlegroups including the 
identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability, and debarkation 
assets; 
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• the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort; 
• the improvement of the performance of all levels of EU operations by 
developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all 
communications equipment and assets both terrestrial and space based; 
• the development of quantitative benchmarks and criteria that national 
forces declared to the Headline Goal have to meet in the field of 
deployability and in the field of multinational training;  
In November 2004, at a Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, EU 
members stated their commitment to further improve their military capabilities. 
Accordingly, they acknowledged their contributions to the EU Battlegroups as part of 
rapid response elements and made initial commitments to the formation of thirteen 
battlegroups.190 To meet the Headline Goal 2010 concerning EU Battlegroups: 
An initial operational capability was achieved in 2005. France and the 
United Kingdom each made a battlegroup available for the first half of 
2005. Italy offered a battlegroup for the second half of 2005. Spain, 
serving as a framework nation (with contributions from Italy, Portugal, 
and Greece) will make a battlegroup available during the first half of 
2006. In 2005, two Battlegroup Coordination Conferences (BGCC) were 
held to finalize the scheduling of battlegroup contributions, confirm the 
composition of individual battlegroups, and identify potential operational 
headquarters. Once a full operational capability is reached in 2007, the EU 
should have the capacity to undertake (and launch nearly simultaneously) 
two concurrent single battalion-sized rapid response operations.191  
Furthermore, “while a variety of missions are possible under the military 
dimension of ESDP, it is set to be able to conduct at least two types of concurrent 
operations”:192
• A single corps-sized crisis management task while retaining enough assets 
to conduct a small-scale operation such as a non-combatant evacuation 
operation (NEO). 
• A long-term operation at less than maximum level of effort while 
conducting another operation of a limited duration. 
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Since 2003, during the capability improvement process, the EU has conducted 
various kinds of operations. In January 2003, the EU launched its first civilian crisis 
management operation – a European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Sarajevo. Two 
months later, the EU conducted its first military peacekeeping mission, Operation 
Concordia, which succeeded NATO’s Allied Harmony operation in Macedonia. In June 
2003, the EU launched a second military peacekeeping mission, Operation Artemis, to 
secure the town of Bunia in the Congolese province of Ituri. In late 2003, Operation 
EUPOL Proxima, the second police mission, replaced Operation Concordia. One year 
later, the EU launched its first rule-of-law mission, EUJUST Themis, to support the 
Georgian criminal justice system. That same year, the EU also took over the NATO 
SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, in January 2005, a police mission, 
EUPOL Kinshasa, was launched in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to reinforce the 
country’s internal security.193
Despite these accomplishments and some concrete steps in the process of 
improving its military capabilities, the question of whether the EU will meet its main 
objectives remains unclear. It is a slow-moving process, accompanied by political 
divergence among its members and an increasing military gap between EU members and 
the United States. An analysis of the latest Capability Improvement Chart of 2005 
suggests that little improvement has been made up to now among many established 
goals.194
Furthermore, the gap in the defense expenditures between the United States and 
its European counterparts demonstrates the challenge Europeans face in reaching their 
goals as well as their political unwillingness to do so. The United States spent $281 
million as its share of NATO’s defense expenditures in 1999 and $348.5 million in 2002 
against a European share of $194.4 and $196 million, respectively. A deep look into their 
overall military spending along with their proportion of GDP draws an even more 
realistic picture (table 1). From a realistic perspective, the Europeans will never reach 
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their American partner in the realm of military capabilities. Nonetheless, they have no 
other choice but to try to develop their capabilities in order to keep NATO and the 
transatlantic partnership, in general, healthy in the coming future. In sum, the future of 
the Alliance will be determined by how Europeans manage their defense initiative.  
 
Table 1. NATO Defense Expenditures195 
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Established in and for a bygone era, NATO has survived the most difficult period 
in its history, the years following the end of the Cold War. It lost the enemy and reason 
for creating this great Transatlantic Alliance. During those years, the debate about its 
future took place primarily in writing that now comprises a substantial body of literature. 
Some writers argued that NATO had done its job and no longer had a purpose for 
continuing. But soon, events in the Balkans justified the viewpoint of others who saw 
NATO as the international organization most capable of meeting the challenges posed by 
the new security environment. They argued that the new challenges were unprecedented 
and thus required new capabilities and new concepts, as well as a more cooperative effort 
by all nations to deal with these challenges effectively. At the time, NATO’s commitment 
to carrying out the recommendations of the 1999 Washington Summit assured its survival 
and resulted in its remarkable transformation from a Cold War defense Alliance to a Pan-
European security organization. 
When the 9/11 terrorist attacks produced additional challenges to NATO’s 
relevance and future, three prevailing questions were raised. First, is NATO adaptable 
and flexible enough to be of significant use in an age of asymmetric warfare? Second, can 
and should Alliance structures and resources be deployed on military operations outside 
Europe? Finally, does any of this matter, given that the United States seems to be losing 
interest in international institutions generally and in NATO in particular? To some 
degree, the Prague summit evidenced a positive response. It showed the willingness of 
NATO members to act together to meet the new challenges by launching the Prague 
Capabilities Commitments as part of a continuing Alliance effort to improve and develop 
new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high-threat environment. NATO also 
addressed the more problematic issue of “out-of-area” operations, taking a position that 
was later reinforced by its operation in Afghanistan. 
Nonetheless, the U.S.–led Iraq War brought about a grave crisis in the 
Transatlantic Alliance which clearly highlighted the differences on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Once again, in the post-9/11 world, NATO faces an existential crisis. The 
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combination of the new global security challenges, the achievement of much of NATO’s 
historic mission in Europe, and the increasing unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy is once 
again calling the Alliance’s future into doubt. Some analysts argue that NATO must 
either develop a global role in response to the new security challenges or face 
redundancy. Others argue that moving outside Europe would undermine the important 
role that NATO still has to play in its own neighborhood and, therefore, the Alliance’s 
effectiveness and viability overall. NATO acted on the former option, taking over the 
peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan and a training mission in Iraq, offering a new 
partnership to countries in the Middle East, and, most recently, providing logistic and 
training support to the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of 
Sudan. 
In brief, NATO has survived by accomplishing the biggest transformation process 
in its history, which transformed it from a regional collective defense organization to a 
collective security organization having global aspirations. Its first front abroad is the 
greater Middle East and Northern Africa. Today NATO is bigger and busier than ever, 
and the ties that bind the two sides of the Atlantic together remain strong enough to bind 
them in the future. The United States and the other NATO members share the same 
strategic interest in maintaining the Alliance in the new security environment that has so 
many challenges that no nation can handle them without cooperation with others. 
Although the future of the Alliance will be shaped by efforts on both sides of the, one 
projection into the future suggests that NATO may eventually look like this: 
• An Alliance of twenty-six or more members that still is able to make 
decisions, led by an active U.S. political and military role; 
• A stronger European military role in Balkans and more coherent EU 
foreign policies but a Europe still lacking key capabilities for high-
intensity warfare; 
• Intense and regular NATO-EU cooperation with back-to-back ministerial 
meetings; 
• A reduced NATO military presence in the Balkans with Bosnia-




                                                
• U.S. deployment of a limited strategic missile defense system and 
European deployments of tactical missile defenses with their forces, in 
company with a strategic convergence in the Alliance on the role of 
missile defenses; 
• Formal links between the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the 
OSCE with both working on issues such as disaster relief and stability in 
the Caucasus and central Asia; 
• “A continued and intensified role for the Partnership for Peace, even as the 
number of partners declines as countries join NATO;” 
• Quasi-associate status with NATO for Russia, with political solution to 
Kaliningrad and many areas of cooperation, including tactical missile 
defenses; 
• A formal and effective NATO relationship with the United Nations; 
• A more global NATO outlook, featuring intensified cooperation with 
Mediterranean nations, modeled on the Partnership for Peace, and a formal 
Asia-NATO dialogue.196 
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